On 8/28/2014 9:42 AM, Man Ho (Certizen) wrote:
> I think some CAs don't
> even want to claim they are CAB/Forum BR compliant, but just want to be
> included in all root certificate programs.
What I mean is that some CAs don't want to claim they are CAB/Forum BR
compliant, but committed to conform
I concur with Eric.
-- Adriano
Il 28/08/2014 04:57, Eric Mill ha scritto:
Microsoft publicly deprecated SHA-1 as a valid SSL certificate signature
algorithm in Nov 2013:
http://blogs.technet.com/b/pki/archive/2013/11/12/sha1-deprecation-policy.aspx
And just a week ago, Chrome announced their
Microsoft publicly deprecated SHA-1 as a valid SSL certificate signature
algorithm in Nov 2013:
http://blogs.technet.com/b/pki/archive/2013/11/12/sha1-deprecation-policy.aspx
And just a week ago, Chrome announced their SHA-1 deprecation window:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!msg/
On Thu, Aug 28, 2014 at 09:42:13AM +0800, Man Ho (Certizen) wrote:
> Concerning about a list of BRs that the CA is still working to conform
> with, I don't think CAs will agree to publish in public for security
> reason and also because of business sensitivity. I think some CAs don't
> even want to
CA's management assertions is exactly for this purpose, i.e. a
public-facing statement. And according to Webtrust, auditor should give
an independent opinion on the assertions.
Concerning about a list of BRs that the CA is still working to conform
with, I don't think CAs will agree to publish in p
On 8/25/14, 3:24 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 8/21/14, 4:28 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 8/14/14, 11:43 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
On 7/31/14, 2:36 PM, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
Comodo has applied to include the “COMODO RSA Certification Authority”,
“USERTrust RSA Certification Authority”, and
On 8/27/14, 7:11 AM, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
David E. Ross a écrit :
With a redacted audit report, the presumption
should be that hidden negative information exists that would disqualify
the certification authority from having its root certificate in the NSS
database if such information were
On 8/27/2014 7:11 AM, Jean-Marc Desperrier wrote:
> David E. Ross a écrit :
>> With a redacted audit report, the presumption
>> should be that hidden negative information exists that would disqualify
>> the certification authority from having its root certificate in the NSS
>> database if such info
David E. Ross a écrit :
With a redacted audit report, the presumption
should be that hidden negative information exists that would disqualify
the certification authority from having its root certificate in the NSS
database if such information were disclosed.
any redaction would imply the existen
9 matches
Mail list logo
