On Fri, Jun 02, 2017 at 09:54:55AM -0400, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy 
wrote:
> The general principle I was trying to capture was one of "Only sign these
> defined structures, and only do so in a manner conforming to their
> appropriate encoding, and only do so after validating all the necessary
> information. Anything else is 'misissuance' - of a certificate, a CRL, an
> OCSP response, or a Signed-Thingy"

For whatever it is worth, I am a fan of this way of defining "misissuance".

- Matt

_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Reply via email to