Given that we're past the 7/31 deadline and the comments in support of
following Chrome's lead, it sounds likely that that's what's happening. And
I think that's an understandable conclusion for Mozilla to draw, given the
compatibility risk Mozilla would be leading on for at least several months.
On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 7:17 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> On 31/07/2017 16:06, Gervase Markham wrote:
>>
>> On 31/07/17 15:00, Jakob Bohm wrote:
>>>
>>> - Due to current Mozilla implementation bugs,
>>
>>
>> Reference, please?
>>
>
> I am
On 31/07/2017 16:06, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 31/07/17 15:00, Jakob Bohm wrote:
It was previously stated in this newsgroup that non-SSLServer trust
would not be terminated, at least for now.
It was? Reference, please?
That was my general impression, I don't have a good way to search the
On 25/07/17 18:13, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> I would also love to see a more standardized notice mechanism that is
> universal to all CAs. Right now, notifying CAs is a pain as some have
> different webforms, some use email, and some don't readily tell you how to
> contact them about certificate
On 29/07/17 23:45, Peter Bowen wrote:
> First, when the server authentication trust will bits be removed from
> the existing roots. This is of notable importance for non-Firefox
> users of NSS. Based on the Chrome email, it looks like they will
> remove trust bits in their git repo around August
On 30/07/2017 00:45, Peter Bowen wrote:
On Thu, Jul 27, 2017 at 11:14 PM, Gervase Markham via
dev-security-policy wrote:
Google have made a final decision on the various dates they plan to
implement as part of the consensus plan in the Symantec matter.
Hi Olfa,
On 31/07/17 11:55, Olfa Kaddachi wrote:
> 2) The deficiencies identified in those controls after the misissuance of
> each of these certificates are essentially:
> •controls on the field subject alternative names :
> o this field must not contains private addresses
> o this
On 28/07/2017 18:36, David E. Ross wrote:
On 7/28/2017 6:34 AM, Alex Gaynor wrote:
Frankly I was surprised to see Chromium reverse course on this -- they have
a history of aggressive leadership in their handling of CA failures, it's a
little disappointing to see them abandon that.
I'd strongly
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Hi Jonathan,
Please find below the description of the technical and organizational controls
required:
1) The currently process of certificates issuance is composed by 4 steps:
step 1: Registration process:
This step consists of the verification of the following items:
•the subscriber identify
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