Hello,
Many thanks for the research - this CT analysis is both fascinating and useful.
I'd like to address the following statement:
"Noncompliance already visible from previously logged certificates. The
HydrantID SSL ICA G2 CA is trusted by Mozilla (via QuoVadis) for TLS
Am 10.04.2018 um 01:10 schrieb Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy:
Getting back to the earlier question about email certificates, I am now of
the opinion that we should limit the scope of this policy update to TLS
certificates. The current language for email certificates isn't clear and
any
Wayne: I agree with your latest proposal.
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+doug.beattie=globalsign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Wayne
> Thayer via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Monday, April 9, 2018 7:10 PM
> To:
On Tuesday, 10 April 2018 01:06:36 UTC+2, Peter Bachman wrote:
> https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/cus-policy-layer
Can you give us a few words, with the links you drop here? It would be nice.
Especially when in order to see what the link is about you must first become a
member of the
I do not understand this secrecy for reading anyway.
Andrew
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As far as I know, this has nothing to do with Mozilla policy.
On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 10:28 PM westmail24--- via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> If Mozilla develops an open product, then why are some discussions
> unavailable to users even for reading? (I'm
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