We created this bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1588213
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On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 3:14 PM Doug Beattie
wrote:
> Ryan,
>
> Are you recommending that:
> a) we need a new domain validation method that describes this, or
> b) those CAs that want to play with fire can go ahead and do that based on
> their own individual security analysis, or
> c) we need a
Ryan,
Are you recommending that:
a) we need a new domain validation method that describes this, or
b) those CAs that want to play with fire can go ahead and do that based on
their own individual security analysis, or
c) we need a clear policy/guideline in the BRs or root program that MUST be
fol
On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 2:10 PM Clint Wilson wrote:
> Apologies, but this isn't entirely clear to me. I'm guessing (hoping) my
> misunderstanding centers around a difference between the Applicant fully
> delegating DNS to the CA vs the Applicant only configuring a single CNAME
> record? If the Ap
Everything I have ever said on this thread can now be found in one article:
https://casecurity.org/2019/10/10/the-insecure-elephant-in-the-room/
This was by invitation of the CA Security Council a few months ago.
I have never worked for a CA and I have never had any reason to say anything in
fa
I’ve replied for the record even though you say this is your last post on this
particular thread, or to me. I’m good with that as I don’t think you care about
what anything anyone says outside the browser vendor world anyway.
> On Oct 9, 2019, at 5:09 PM, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed,
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