Re: SECURITY RELEVANT FOR CAs: The curious case of the Dangerous Delegated Responder Cert

El martes, 14 de julio de 2020 a las 9:02:01 UTC+2, Filippo Valsorda escribió: > This whole argument seems to lose track of the difference between CAs and > RPs. CAs have strict responsibilities to follow all the rules of the policies > they committed to in order to be trusted by RPs. Full

Re: Clarification about WebTrust BR and WebTrust EV audits

, if the approach is as the following picture shows, why would it be necessary to have a WT4CA? [image: Imágenes integradas 2] BR (Best Regards, no Baseline Requirements ;-) Chema López about.me/chemalogo [image: Chema López on about.me] http://about.me/chemalogo 2014-11-06 22:50 GMT+01:00

Re: Checking certificate requirements

Thanks, Kurt, for sharing! m...@chemalogo.com +34 666 429 224 (Spain) gplus.to/chemalogo @chemalogo https://twitter.com/chemalogo/ www.linkedin.com/in/chemalogo Skype: chemalogo On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Kurt Roeckx k...@roeckx.be wrote: I've been working on checking that certificates

Re: QuoVadis Request to Include Renewed Roots

turn on all three trust bits for the RCA1 and RCA3 root certs, and turn on the websites and code signing trust bits for the RCA2 root cert. Are they asking for the same bits/CA that they already had with the precious CAs? Maybe this is not the adequate forum but have they consider Microsoft new

Re: Question about BR audit

I think this is okey. m...@chemalogo.com +34 666 429 224 (Spain) gplus.to/chemalogo @chemalogo https://twitter.com/chemalogo/ www.linkedin.com/in/chemalogo Skype: chemalogo On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 12:19 AM, Kathleen Wilson kwil...@mozilla.comwrote: On 3/6/14, 9:58 AM, Kathleen Wilson wrote: