Re: Mississuance of EV Certificates

2017-12-18 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
Am Dienstag, 12. Dezember 2017 11:10:00 UTC+1 schrieb cornel...@swisssign.com: > 1)How your CA first became aware of the problem (e.g. via a problem report > submitted to your Problem Reporting Mechanism, a discussion in > mozilla.dev.security.policy, a Bugzilla bug, or internal self-audit), and

Re: Mississuance of EV Certificates

2017-12-13 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
Am Dienstag, 12. Dezember 2017 16:19:22 UTC+1 schrieb Nick Lamb: > Hi, > > I have a couple of follow-up questions if I may: > > On Tue, 12 Dec 2017 02:09:47 -0800 (PST) > "cornelia.enke--- via dev-security-policy" > wrote: > > > The subject information in the affected certificates were not > >

Re: Mississuance of EV Certificates

2017-12-12 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
I have to correct one thing: 7) The implemented controls detected the misconfiguration, when we detectetd the misconfiguration the report was given within 24 hours. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://list

Re: Incident Certificate signed with SHA1 Violation BR 7.3.1

2017-09-15 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
Am Montag, 11. September 2017 12:38:38 UTC+2 schrieb Gervase Markham: > Hi Connie, > > On 06/09/17 20:38, cornelia.enk...@gmail.com wrote: > > SwissSign has identified the following incident: > > two Certificate signed with SHA1: Violation BR 7.3.1 > > Thank you for this report. There have been a

Re: Incident Certificate signed with SHA1 Violation BR 7.3.1

2017-09-15 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
Am Freitag, 15. September 2017 10:55:38 UTC+2 schrieb corneli...@gmail.com: > Am Mittwoch, 6. September 2017 22:38:35 UTC+2 schrieb Nick Lamb: > > Thanks for writing this incident report. > > > > The latter of the two certificates was issued after popular web browsers > > had ceased accepting SHA

Re: Incident Certificate signed with SHA1 Violation BR 7.3.1

2017-09-15 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
Am Mittwoch, 6. September 2017 22:38:35 UTC+2 schrieb Nick Lamb: > Thanks for writing this incident report. > > The latter of the two certificates was issued after popular web browsers had > ceased accepting SHA-1 as far as I understand it. As a result it seems likely > that it would not have fu

Re: Incident Certificate signed with SHA1 Violation BR 7.3.1

2017-09-15 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
t; > On 06/09/17 20:38, cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy wrote: > > SwissSign has identified the following incident: > > two Certificate signed with SHA1: Violation BR 7.3.1 > > > > 1) > > During an internal audit on 05.09.2017 we found out that there are two &g

Re: Incident Certificate signed with SHA1 Violation BR 7.3.1

2017-09-15 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
Am Montag, 11. September 2017 12:38:38 UTC+2 schrieb Gervase Markham: > Hi Connie, > > On 06/09/17 20:38, cornelia.enk...@gmail.com wrote: > > SwissSign has identified the following incident: > > two Certificate signed with SHA1: Violation BR 7.3.1 > > Thank you for this report. There have been a

Incident Certificate signed with SHA1 Violation BR 7.3.1

2017-09-06 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
SwissSign has identified the following incident: two Certificate signed with SHA1: Violation BR 7.3.1 1) During an internal audit on 05.09.2017 we found out that there are two certificates issued after 16.01.2015 and signed with a SHA1 hash. After the discovery of two certificates, the following

Re: ETSI auditors still not performing full annual audits?

2017-07-05 Thread cornelia.enke66--- via dev-security-policy
Am Montag, 19. Juni 2017 21:15:09 UTC+2 schrieb Kathleen Wilson: > I just filed https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1374381 about an > audit statement that I received for SwissSign. I have copied the bug > description below, because I am concerned that there still may be ETSI > auditors