(Sending from the right e-mail this time)
Thanks for the responses! I think this is a great thing to bring here,
because there are some interplays with policy and implications that can
affect the design, as I discuss below. I'm trying to be mindful of
proffering solutions outside of the TLS-WG,
On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 4:35 PM watson--- via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> We are interested in CAs signing x509 certificates that can be used with
> delegated credentials for TLS,
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-03. The certificates
>
We are interested in CAs signing x509 certificates that can be used with
delegated credentials for TLS,
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-03. The certificates to be
signed by the CA are x509 certificates that contain a special extension that
identifies them as being able to
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