Hi Corey,

FWIW, at least one of those CAs are no longer active, such as 5388 WoSign: 
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2016/10/24/distrusting-new-wosign-and-startcom-certificates/
 - do old CAs get removed from CCADB or marked inactive in that system?

I do like the idea of linking the specific document over the general repo page.

Regards,

Tyler

-----Original Message-----
From: dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org> On 
Behalf Of Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy
Sent: Thursday, May 2, 2019 9:54 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: [EXT]Unretrievable CPS documents listed in CCADB

Hello,
Section 4 of Mozilla Root Store Policy states that CAs are bound by the latest 
Common CCADB Policy (http://ccadb.org/policy). Section 5 of the Common CCADB 
Policy specifies the requirements for CAs regarding providing URLs to various 
documents, such as the CP, CPS, and audit reports. In particular, “the URLs to 
such CPs, CPSes and audits, and any metadata about them such as the name of the 
auditor or the date of the audit, need to be updated as new information become 
available.”

The current AllCertificateRecordsReport.csv was downloaded and the CPS URLs for 
all unrevoked intermediate and root certificates were extracted. Each extracted 
CPS URL was then requested via HTTP GET using cURL and the HTTP response status 
code recorded. Below is a list of all CPS URLs which return a HTTP status code 
of 400 or greater:

"Row number", "CA Owner", "Certificate Name", "CPS URL", "HTTP status code"
7, "AC Camerfirma, S.A.", "Chambers of Commerce Root", 
http://docs.camerfirma.com/publico/DocumentosWeb/politicas/CPS_eidas_EN_v_1_2_3.pdf,
 404
191, Atos, "Atos TrustedRoot 2011", 
https://pki.atos.net/Download/AtosTrustedCACPSv1.9.0.pdf, 404
258, "Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional", "SIGNE Autoridad de 
Certificacion", 
http://www.signe.es/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/DPC_SIGNE_2.1-180731.pdf, 404
262, Buypass, "Buypass Class 2 CA 1", 
http://www.buypass.com/home/support/ca-documentation-legal, 404
466, "Deutscher Sparkassen Verlag GmbH (S-TRUST, DSV-Gruppe)", "S-TRUST 
Authentication and Encryption Root CA 2005:PN", 
http://www.s-trust.de/stn-cps/stn_cps.pdf, 404
468, "Deutscher Sparkassen Verlag GmbH (S-TRUST, DSV-Gruppe)", "TC TrustCenter 
Class 3 CA II", https://www.s-trust.de/stn-cps, 404
594, DigiCert, "ADACOM CA for EU Qualified e-Seals", 
https://pki.adacom.com/repository/en/CPS/files/Certification_Practice_Statement_for_EU_Qualified_certificates_v3.pdf,
 404
634, DigiCert, "Allgeier IT Solutions CA", 
https://www.s-trust.de/ablage_download_dokumente/ablage_pdf/S-TRUST_STN_CPS_V3_87.pdf,
 404
741, DigiCert, "Belgium Root CA2", 
https://stage-pki.belgium.be/resources/PKI-BelgiumRootCA-CPS-v1.2.pdf, 404
1394, DigiCert, "Government AA", 
https://stage-pki.belgium.be/resources/Government-CA-Certification-Practice-Statement-v1.0.pdf,
 404
1546, DigiCert, "Microsoft IT SSL CA 1", 
https://www.microsoft.com/pki/mscorp/cps/Microsoft%20IT%20PKI%20CP-CPS%20for%20SSL%20Ver%201%203%20January%202015.htm,
 404
1551, DigiCert, "Microsoft IT SSL SHA2", 
http://www.microsoft.com/pki/mscorp/cps/Microsoft%20IT%20PKI%20CP-CPS%20for%20SSL%20Ver%201%203%20January%202015.htm,
 404
2494, "Financijska agencija (Fina)", "Fina Root CA", 
http://rdc.fina.hr/QTSA2017/FinaQTSA, 404
2815, "Government of France (ANSSI, DCSSI)", IGC/A, 
http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/site_article15.html, 404
2991, "Government of Tunisia, Agence National de Certification Electronique / 
National Digital Certification Agency (ANCE/NDCA)", "Tunisian Root Certificate 
Authority - TunRootCA2", 
http://www.tuntrust.tn/sites/default/files/documents/PolitiqueSERVEURS-PTC-BR-08.pdf,
 404
3209, "Microsec Ltd.", "e-Szigno Class2 CA 2017", 
https://static.e-szigno.hu/docs/szsz--fok--sea--EN--v2.8.pdf, 404
3211, "Microsec Ltd.", "e-Szigno Class3 CA 2017", 
https://static.e-szigno.hu/docs/szsz--fok--sig--EN--v2.8.pdf, 404
3216, "Microsec Ltd.", "e-Szigno Qualified CA 2017", 
https://static.e-szigno.hu/docs/szsz--min--sig--EN--v2.8.pdf, 404
3217, "Microsec Ltd.", "e-Szigno Qualified Organization CA 2017", 
https://static.e-szigno.hu/docs/szsz--min--sea--EN--v2.8.pdf, 404
3308, "Pos Digicert Sdn. Bhd (Malaysia)", "PosDigicert Class 2 Root CA G2", 
https://www.posdigicert.com.my/public/uploads/files/CPS-Rev-60.pdf, 404
3442, "SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD.", http://www.valicert.com/, 
https://repository.secomtrust.net/rootrepository/CPSen.pdf, 404
3445, "SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD.", "Security Communication EV RootCA1", 
https://repository.secomtrust.net/EV-Root1/index.html, 404
4526, "T-Systems International GmbH (Deutsche Telekom)", "Deutsche Telekom AG 
Issuing CA 01", http://corporate-pki.telekom.de/cps/cps.htm, 403
4528, "T-Systems International GmbH (Deutsche Telekom)", "Deutsche Telekom AG 
Issuing CA 01", http://corporate-pki1.telekom.de/cps/cps.htm, 403
5242, "Telia Company (formerly TeliaSonera)", "Sonera Class1 CA", 
http://repository.trust.teliasonera.com/CPS/index3.html, 404
5388, "WoSign CA Limited", "CA WoSign ECC Root", 
http://www.wosign.com/policy/wosign-policy-1-2-12.pdf, 403
5436, Zetes, "ZETES TSP ROOT CA 001", http://repository.tsp.zetes.com/Zetes, 404

Given that these URLs return error HTTP status codes, I do not believe these 
CCADB entries comply with CCADB Policy (and by extension, Mozilla Policy).

As an aside, I noticed that several URLs listed in CCADB are “Legal Repository” 
web page URLs that contain a list of many CP/CPS documents. My recommendation 
is to slightly amend CCADB Policy to require CAs to provide URLs to the 
specific document in question rather than a general “Legal Repository” page, 
where it is left up to the reader to decide which hyperlink on the page is the 
correct document.

Thanks,
Corey
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