Re: [FORGED] Re: [FORGED] Re: Incident report - Misissuance of CISCO VPN server certificates by Microsec

2018-12-07 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
Paul Wouters via dev-security-policy writes: >I'm not sure how that is helpful for those crypto libraries who mistakenly >believe a certificate is a TLS certificate and thus if the EKU is not empty >it should have serverAuth or clientAuth. Sure, it wouldn't help with current libraries that

Re: [FORGED] Re: Incident report - Misissuance of CISCO VPN server certificates by Microsec

2018-12-07 Thread Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
2018. december 6., csütörtök 23:31:42 UTC+1 időpontban Peter Gutmann a következőt írta: > > So just to make sure I've got this right, implementations are needing to add > dummy TLS EKUs to non-TLS certs in order for them to "work"? In that case why > not add a signalling EKU or policy value, a

Re: [FORGED] Re: Incident report - Misissuance of CISCO VPN server certificates by Microsec

2018-12-07 Thread Paul Wouters via dev-security-policy
On Thu, 6 Dec 2018, Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy wrote: Paul Wouters via dev-security-policy writes: Usually X509 is validated using standard libraries that only think of the TLS usage. So most certificates for VPN usage still add EKUs like serverAuth or clientAuth, or there will

Re: [FORGED] Re: Incident report - Misissuance of CISCO VPN server certificates by Microsec

2018-12-06 Thread Peter Gutmann via dev-security-policy
Paul Wouters via dev-security-policy writes: >Usually X509 is validated using standard libraries that only think of the TLS >usage. So most certificates for VPN usage still add EKUs like serverAuth or >clientAuth, or there will be interop problems. So just to make sure I've got this right,