On Sun, May 31, 2015 at 6:43 PM, Ryan Sleevi <
ryan-mozdevsecpol...@sleevi.com> wrote:
> On Sat, May 30, 2015 2:47 pm, Brian Smith wrote:
> > The main sticks that browsers have in enforcing their CA policies is the
> > threat of removal. However, such a threat seem completely empty when
> > rem
On Sun, May 31, 2015 at 12:43 PM, Ryan Sleevi <
ryan-mozdevsecpol...@sleevi.com> wrote:
> However, that you later bring in the idea that government's may pass laws
>
that make it illegal for browsers to take enforcement is, arguably,
> without merit or evidence. If we accept that "governments may
On Sun, May 31, 2015 at 3:43 PM, Ryan Sleevi
wrote:
> On Sat, May 30, 2015 2:47 pm, Brian Smith wrote:
>> IIRC, in the past, we've seen CAs that lapse in compliance with Mozilla's
>> CA policies and that have claimed they cannot do the work to become
>> compliant again until new legislation has
On Sat, May 30, 2015 2:47 pm, Brian Smith wrote:
> It seems reasonable to assume that governments that have publicly-trusted
> roots will provide essential government services from websites secured
> using certificates that depend on those roots staying publicly-trusted.
> Further, it is likely
I agree with Peter that the policy shouldn’t detail the steps for Physical
Relocation. As written, it seems to confuse offline roots with online
issuing CAs that are typically housed in a data center. Moving a CA’s
online operations to a new data center is quite different from moving
parts of a
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