RE: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-08-25 Thread Richard Wang
We know how to do in the future, and believe me we will do this better. Best Regards, Richard -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard=wosign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Matt Palmer Sent: Friday, August 26, 2016 10:03 AM To: dev-

RE: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-08-25 Thread Richard Wang
Yes, sorry for this. As I admitted that this discussion gives us a big lesson that we know when we need to report incident to all browsers. We guarantee we will do it better. Best Regards, Richard -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richar

RE: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-08-25 Thread Richard Wang
See below inline, thanks Best Regards, Richard -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard=wosign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Matt Palmer Sent: Friday, August 26, 2016 7:35 AM To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: I

RE: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-08-25 Thread Richard Wang
See below inline, thanks. Best Regards, Richard -Original Message- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+richard=wosign@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Ryan Sleevi Sent: Friday, August 26, 2016 3:10 AM To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subjec

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-08-25 Thread Matt Palmer
On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 05:15:58PM -0700, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > On Thursday, August 25, 2016 at 4:35:39 PM UTC-7, Matt Palmer wrote: > > I'm after the specifics of the changes to WoSign's policies and procedures > > regarding *notification*, not quality control. What were WoSign's previous > > poli

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-08-25 Thread Ryan Sleevi
On Thursday, August 25, 2016 at 4:35:39 PM UTC-7, Matt Palmer wrote: > I'm after the specifics of the changes to WoSign's policies and procedures > regarding *notification*, not quality control. What were WoSign's previous > policies and procedures regarding notification (obviously there was > som

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-08-25 Thread Matt Palmer
On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 07:11:18AM +, Richard Wang wrote: > We can post all 2015 issued SSL certificate to CT log server if necessary. That doesn't provide any assurance, in the face of misleading notBefore values in certificates. Without strong assurances that whatever failure of systems or

Re: NEW Certificate Manager Add-on

2016-08-25 Thread Kathleen Wilson
An updated version of the signed Certificate Manager Add-on is available here: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/certificate-manager/ The uninstall bug has been fixed. https://github.com/sidstamm/FirefoxCertificateManager/issues/39 The CA Information that it pulls from the CA Commun

Re: Amazon Root Inclusion Request

2016-08-25 Thread Kathleen Wilson
> This request from Amazon is to enable EV treatment for the > currently-included “Starfield Services Root Certificate > Authority - G2 certificate, and to include the following 4 new root > certificates, turn on the Email and Websites trust bits for them, > and enable EV treatment for all of th

Re: StartCom's StartPKI

2016-08-25 Thread rugk
Okay, thanks for your information. Also note that there is a difference to StartResell. On their hompage (https://startssl.com/NewsDetails?date=20160530) they also state, that resellers have their own intermediate certificate. However there they seem to do the verification by themself and "charg

Re: FNMT Root Inclusion Request

2016-08-25 Thread Kathleen Wilson
On Thursday, August 11, 2016 at 4:36:02 PM UTC-7, Kathleen Wilson wrote: > >> FNMT has applied to include the “AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM” root certificate > >> and enable the Websites trust bit. > >> > >> Fábrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre (FNMT) is a government agency > >> that provides services to Spa

Re: Japan GPKI Root Renewal Request

2016-08-25 Thread Kathleen Wilson
> This request by the Government of Japan, Ministry of Internal > Affairs and Communications, is to include the GPKI 'ApplicationCA2 Root' > certificate and enable the Websites trust bit. This new root certificate > has been created in order to comply with the Baseline Requirements, and > will

Re: StartCom's StartPKI

2016-08-25 Thread Ryan Sleevi
On Thursday, August 25, 2016 at 10:11:21 AM UTC-7, rugk wrote: > Hi, > I stumbled across this service by StartCom: > https://startssl.com/StartPKI (archive link: https://archive.is/GRkAK) > I got a bit afraid when looking at their nice screenshots > (https://archive.is/GRkAK#75%), because they of

Re: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-08-25 Thread Ryan Sleevi
On Thursday, August 25, 2016 at 12:14:10 AM UTC-7, Richard Wang wrote: > We can post all 2015 issued SSL certificate to CT log server if necessary. Is there any reason not to do that proactively? > For BR auditor, I think this issue is too technical that fewer auditor can > find out this problem

StartCom's StartPKI

2016-08-25 Thread rugk
Hi, I stumbled across this service by StartCom: https://startssl.com/StartPKI (archive link: https://archive.is/GRkAK) I got a bit afraid when looking at their nice screenshots (https://archive.is/GRkAK#75%), because they offer intermediate certificates for companies allowing them to issue cert

RE: Incidents involving the CA WoSign

2016-08-25 Thread Richard Wang
Thanks for your friendly reminder. We can post all 2015 issued SSL certificate to CT log server if necessary. For BR auditor, I think this issue is too technical that fewer auditor can find out this problem. We will add the quality control system to PKI system before issuing the certificate, a