On Wednesday, December 21, 2016 at 11:03:18 AM UTC-8, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> This request from D-TRUST is to included the ‘D-TRUST Root CA 3 2013’ root
> certificate and enable the Email trust bit.
> D-TRUST GmbH is a subsidiary of Bundesdruckerei GmbH and is fully owned by
> the German
Our fourth response to questions is posted at Bugzilla,
It includes two attachments at that bug:
From: Ryan Sleevi
I wanted to send out a short update of were we are on looking into the reported
Incapusla/testslsslfeb20.me certificate and the thread of comments and
In this specific case the domain was verified within 39 months of
issuance/reissuance (no difference as Ryan pointed out).
I've read though the English language version of CP/CPS dated March 30,
2016 version 1 and made the following notes:
No version history at the front of the document. This not required, but is
evidence of good document change management and is a useful reference to
see what's changed when
On 03/03/17 10:16, benjaminp...@gmail.com wrote:
> Could RSASSA-PSS as the used signature algorithm be the Problem?
Yes, we don't support that. Although we may at some point:
On 02/03/17 20:45, Eric Mill wrote:
> Our goal is to start a new root and set of issuing CAs that is completely
> disconnected and separate from the existing Federal PKI bridge network that
> members of the web PKI community may be familiar with.
Are you able to say whether you will be seeking a
On 28/02/17 20:02, douglas.beat...@gmail.com wrote:
> Suspicious Test certificate
> I provided a formal response in that thread that I believe closes
> this issue.
I still have an outstanding question.
On 28/02/17 12:44, douglas.beat...@gmail.com wrote:
> Sorry, I missed the last request. As outlined above, this domain was
> added to this account for only a very short period of time and then
> it was removed, so it's no longer being used. Further, we've
> educated the groups involved
Am Mittwoch, 1. März 2017 18:18:55 UTC+1 schrieb Gervase Markham:
> On 01/03/17 10:36, benjaminp...@gmail.com wrote:
> > screenshot of the error message: http://imgur.com/a/BIQUm
> That error message will not occur if only the root CA is SHA-1 signed,
> because Firefox does not check the
On Friday, 3 March 2017 07:49:28 UTC, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> It is not acceptable. It's explicitly prohibited multiple ways to allow
> more than 24 hours when such situations are brought to the CAs' attention.
I'm sympathetic to the idea, here and in all cases where we have no reason to
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