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> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Adrian R. via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Friday, September 01, 2017 4:09 AM
> To:
On Thursday, August 31, 2017 at 11:31:48 PM UTC-4, Eric Mill wrote:
> Thank you for the continued updates, and for relaying the deadline by which
> these will be revoked.
>
> On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 9:35 PM, identrust--- via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
On Fri, Sep 1, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> RFC2818 postdates real world https by several years. The original de
> facto standard by Netscape/Mozilla used the commonName semantics, which
> survived for more than a decade in
> Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid (Logius)
>
> DN: C=NL, O=KPN Corporate Market BV, CN=KPN Corporate Market CSP
> Organisatie CA - G2
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=f821a600af00d2fa23f569e00fdf2379bc182920205a6b9b0276733cb2857c15
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp2.managedpki.com
Dear
> Government of The Netherlands, PKIoverheid (Logius)
> DN: C=NL, O=KPN Corporate Market BV, CN=KPN Corporate Market CSP
> Organisatie CA - G2
> Example cert:
> https://crt.sh/?q=f821a600af00d2fa23f569e00fdf2379bc182920205a6b9b0276733cb2857c15
> OCSP URI: http://ocsp2.managedpki.com
Dear
On 28/08/17 18:40, Andrew Ayer wrote:
> However, externally-operated sub-CAs generally have their own CAA
> identifiers and problem reporting information, and this information
> is not currently collected. Would it be possible to collect this
> information on a per-intermediate basis and to
On 30/08/17 18:50, Kathleen Wilson wrote:
> https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/08/30/removing-disabled-wosign-startcom-certificates-firefox-58/
>
> I will look into getting this translated and published in China.
Here are the links to the post in Chinese, kindly supplied by our
colleagues:
On 01/09/17 04:47, Víctor wrote:
> But I find an issue here. The root has both websites and email trust
> bits. The subCA cert is not constrained. The representative of the CA
> want to add the subCA to OneCRL because this subCA doesn't issue TLS
> certificates. OneCRL and the CA program acts on
※個人情報保護のため、宛先を非表示（ＢＣＣ）にて送信しています。
-
Paul-san,
Thank you for the notice.
We are going to investigate on this matter.
Best regards,
Hisashi Kamo
Secom Trust Systems
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy
>
Hello everyone,
This is the first time I am writing here. I've been reading for a time (part)
of this list and the Bugzilla section of the CA Program. I hope I can
cooperate. I am specially interested on the technical aspects and legal
implications that electronic certificates have on the EU,
a small question:
what's going to happen with https://www.freessl.com/ ?
under Symantec's leadership it was intended for the site to become a free
alternative to StartCom and LetsEncrypt, but it was not quite opened for
issuance except for non-profits.
Now with the transition of the CA
On 01/09/2017 02:14, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 5:21 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
On 31/08/2017 22:26, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
Agreed. But in general, in order to maintain interoperability, there's a
process for building
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