Re: DNS fragmentation attack subverts DV, 5 public CAs vulnerable

2018-12-11 Thread Leo Grove via dev-security-policy
On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 11:27:52 AM UTC-6, Hector Martin 'marcan' wrote: > On 12/12/2018 01.47, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: > > Is this new from the past discussion? > > I think what's new is someone actually tried this, and found 5 CAs that > are vulnerable and for which

Re: SSL private key for *.alipcsec.com embedded in PC client executables

2018-12-11 Thread Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 08:00:59AM +, Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy wrote: > I think pretty much every ca will accept a signed file in lieu of an > actual key. You'd rather hope so. If there are any CAs out there who *wouldn't* accept a signature from the private key as proof of

RE: Maximal validity of the test TLS certificate issued by a private PKI system

2018-12-11 Thread Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy
Option 1 is the intended interpretation. We specified 30 days because the tokens used for domain validation (Random Number) need to have a useful life of 30 days. The 30-day usage period needed to be put into the definition of the Test Certificate, or into Method 3.2.2.4.9, and we selected the

Maximal validity of the test TLS certificate issued by a private PKI system

2018-12-11 Thread Sándor dr . Szőke via dev-security-policy
It is not absolutely clear for us how to manage the test certificates which were issued by a CA where there are no certificate chains to a root certificate subject to the Baseline Requirements (for example an independent test CA hierarchy). The BR wording is as follows: Test Certificate: A

Re: DNS fragmentation attack subverts DV, 5 public CAs vulnerable

2018-12-11 Thread Hector Martin 'marcan' via dev-security-policy
On 12/12/2018 01.47, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote: > Is this new from the past discussion? I think what's new is someone actually tried this, and found 5 CAs that are vulnerable and for which this attack works in practice. >

Re: DNS fragmentation attack subverts DV, 5 public CAs vulnerable

2018-12-11 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:34 AM Hector Martin via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > I figured this presentation might be of interest to this list: > > > https://i.blackhat.com/eu-18/Thu-Dec-6/eu-18-Heftrig-Off-Path-Attacks-Against-PKI.pdf > > It seems they

DNS fragmentation attack subverts DV, 5 public CAs vulnerable

2018-12-11 Thread Hector Martin via dev-security-policy
I figured this presentation might be of interest to this list: https://i.blackhat.com/eu-18/Thu-Dec-6/eu-18-Heftrig-Off-Path-Attacks-Against-PKI.pdf It seems they found 5 (unspecified) public CAs out of 17 tested were vulnerable to this attack, which can be performed by an off-path attacker.

Re: SSL private key for *.alipcsec.com embedded in PC client executables

2018-12-11 Thread Arvid Vermote via dev-security-policy
Based on the information reported in this thread GlobalSign has started the necessary activities to investigate this potential misuse. Arvid On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 8:24:43 AM UTC+1, Mark Steward wrote: > This time it's just hanging around in memory, no need to do anything > about the

RE: SSL private key for *.alipcsec.com embedded in PC client executables

2018-12-11 Thread Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy
Thank you for this report. We've verified disclosure of the private key for this certificate and have notified the customer that their certificate will be revoked. Due to the large customer impact, we're provided them 24 hours to get new client executables prepared and ready for download by

Re: SSL private key for *.alipcsec.com embedded in PC client executables

2018-12-11 Thread Xiaoyin Liu via dev-security-policy
On 2018/12/11 14:39, Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy wrote: > On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 05:37:41AM +, Xiaoyin Liu via dev-security-policy > wrote: >> It’s clear that the private key for *.alipcsec.com is embedded in the >> executable, > There are ways of implementing SSL such that the

Re: SSL private key for *.alipcsec.com embedded in PC client executables

2018-12-11 Thread Jeremy Rowley via dev-security-policy
I think pretty much every ca will accept a signed file in lieu of an actual key. Generally provide the key just means some proof of compromise the ca can replicate. From: dev-security-policy on behalf of Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy Sent: Monday,