Adding some data points for use by future readers of this thread.
On 08/01/2019 03:26, Corey Bonnell wrote:
> (Posting in a personal capacity as I am no longer employed by Trustwave)
>
> Mozilla Root Store Policy section 5.1
> (https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-gro
Thanks Corey, Ryan, and Jonathan.
In one of the bugs that Ryan created, the CA stated that it's not clear if
or when Mozilla requires revocation of these P-521 certificates. I believe
the answer is that we do not require revocation. Our policy (section 6)
explicitly requires CAs to abide by the BR
On Mon, Jan 7, 2019, at 21:26, Corey Bonnell via dev-security-policy wrote:
> (Posting in a personal capacity as I am no longer employed by Trustwave)
>
> Mozilla Root Store Policy section 5.1
> (https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/)
>
> prohibits
Thanks Corey for reporting these.
As you note, this policy came in to force with Policy 2.4, which as noted
in https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Root_Store_Policy_Archive , had a compliance
date of February 28, 2017. This was also part of a CA Communications item -
https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/
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