All,
Thank you to those of you that have been providing thoughtful and
constructive input into this discussion. I have been carefully reading
and contemplating all of the messages posted in the
mozilla.dev.security.policy forum.
As the owner of Mozilla’s CA Certificates Module[1] and in an
We have attached two files to the bug
(https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532842), one that provides a
list of all certificates issued after ballot 164 that contain 63 bit serial
numbers and one that lists all certificates in that set that have not yet been
revoked.
Ryan Hurst
(Writing in a personal capacity)
Benjamin,
I've focused only on the substantive new information added to this
discussion relevant to trust. I hope the past messages have highlighted why
much of the message may be fundamentally misunderstanding the purpose of a
root store and the root store
On Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 7:18:39 PM UTC+1, Ryan Sleevi wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 12:11 PM Matthew Hardeman via dev-security-policy <
> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> By comparison, the discussion around DarkMatter has been more similar to
> the discussion of Symantec
Dear Selena,
On Wednesday, 6 March 2019 02:58:19 UTC+4, Selena Deckelmann wrote:
>
> I think what you've quoted are accurate statements. That is, recent articles
> raised questions that I, and others, felt were important to bring to this
> public forum to discuss.
>
While we welcome and are
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