Re: GRCA: Out-of-date CPS provided in CCADB

2020-05-14 Thread horn917--- via dev-security-policy
We have updated our CP and English website. Please see https://grca.nat.gov.tw/GRCAeng/index.html ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Re: GoDaddy: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised key within 24 hours

2020-05-14 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Do you have a copy of the OCSP response? With such issues, we may need signed artifacts to demonstrate non-compliance. For example, it shows as revoked via both OCSP and CRL for me. On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 4:32 PM sandybar497--- via dev-security-policy wrote: > > On 7 May 2020 at 12:07:07 PM

ZLint 2.1.0-RC1 and announcement list

2020-05-14 Thread Zakir Durumeric via dev-security-policy
Hi all, Earlier this year, we began publishing semantically versioned ZLint releases based on several requests from CAs. Yesterday, we tagged 2.1.0-RC1 (https://github.com/zmap/zlint/releases/tag/v2.1.0-rc1), which includes the first batch of Mozilla Root Store Policy lints. We have created a

Re: Sectigo: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised key

2020-05-14 Thread sandybar497--- via dev-security-policy
On Wednesday, May 6, 2020 at 5:50:09 AM UTC+10, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > On Tue, May 5, 2020 at 12:35 PM sandybar497--- via dev-security-policy > wrote: > > > > I submitted a compromised key report to Sectigo [ssl_ab...@sectigo.com] on > > 1 May 2020 at 2:03pm UTC but Sectigo failed to revoke the

GoDaddy: Failure to revoke certificate with compromised key within 24 hours

2020-05-14 Thread sandybar497--- via dev-security-policy
On 7 May 2020 at 12:07:07 PM UTC I reported a certificate to GoDaddy at practi...@starfieldtech.com as having its private key compromised. I received the automated acknowledgement confirmation, however, as of 2020-05-09 03:39:36 UTC (well after 24 hours), OCSP still shows the certificate as

Re: AIA CA Issuer field pointing to PEM encoded certs

2020-05-14 Thread Nuno Ponte via dev-security-policy
Dear Hanno, Many thanks for the report. This has now been fixed for Multicert and an incident report was filed at Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1637093 Best regards, NP segunda-feira, 11 de Maio de 2020 às 17:09:08 UTC+1, Hanno Böck escreveu: > Hi, > > As I

RE: 7.1.6.1 Reserved Certificate Policy Identifiers

2020-05-14 Thread Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy
Yes, I should have asked this on the CABF list, and you answered my question with the links below. Thanks! From: Ryan Sleevi Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 8:57 AM To: Doug Beattie Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: 7.1.6.1 Reserved Certificate Policy Identifiers

Re: 7.1.6.1 Reserved Certificate Policy Identifiers

2020-05-14 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
Did you mean to ask this on the CABF list? This is https://github.com/cabforum/documents/issues/179 which I was going to try to fix in https://github.com/sleevi/cabforum-docs/pull/12 (aka “spring” cleanup that is seeking endorsers) The discussion thread is

7.1.6.1 Reserved Certificate Policy Identifiers

2020-05-14 Thread Doug Beattie via dev-security-policy
I have a question about section, 7.1.6.1. It says: This section describes the content requirements for the Root CA, Subordinate CA, and Subscriber Certificates, as they relate to the identification of Certificate Policy. For Subscriber certificates I totally understand and agree with section