Re: Certificate with invalid dnsName issued from Baltimore intermediate

2017-07-18 Thread Charles Reiss via dev-security-policy

On 07/18/2017 11:57 AM, Hanno Böck wrote:

More dotdot-certificates:

[snip]

via searching censys.io:

https://crt.sh/?id=174803642
for *..syntaxafrica.com
Issued by GoDaddy in 2016; expires later this year, but revoked (CRL 
timestamp says a few days after issuance)


https://crt.sh/?id=38662560
for *usmc..afpimsstaging.mil
Issued by U.S. Government in 2012; expired 2015

I also some old internal name certificates:

https://crt.sh/?id=39441152
for autodiscover.eat...ltransport.local
Issued by GoDaddy in 2012; expired 2015

https://crt.sh/?id=39333847
for autodiscover.jgexchange2.bellgibfamily.local
Issued by GoDaddy in 2012; expired 2015
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dNSName containing '/' / low serial number entropy

2017-07-18 Thread Charles Reiss via dev-security-policy
https://crt.sh/?id=174827359 is a certificate issued by D-TRUST SSL 
Class 3 CA 1 2009 containing the DNS SAN 
'www.lbv-gis.brandenburg.de/lbvagszit' (containing a '/') with a 
notBefore in April 2017.


The certificate also seems to have a short certificate serial number, 
which cannot include 64 bits of entropy. Many certificates issued by 
this CA appears to use large serial numbers (e.g. [1]). But there are 
certificates with much shorter sequential-looking serial numbers with 
notBefores shortly before [2] and after [3] this certificate's and as 
recent as 4 July 2017 [4].


[1] https://crt.sh/?id=137090990 , https://crt.sh/?id=124715040
[2] 
https://censys.io/certificates/4445455caca3e9cf2ab2b673304487cb220871aa6d5ac1bf03827f74609c3646
[3] 
https://censys.io/certificates/8d08033efe732e8fb6c2f3257c52b500af991bd1f363ffd6e29ec1812a943cd9

[4] https://crt.sh/?id=173758922


I did a cursory check on censys.io to see if there were other cases of 
short serial numbers in certificates with recent notBefores that are 
trusted by Mozilla:


- Digidentity Services CA - G2 (https://crt.sh/?caid=868 ; chains to 
Staat der Nederlanden Root CA - G2) has issued certificates which serial 
numbers that appear to be of the form 0x1000 + sequential counter 
with notBefores as recent as 8 June 2017.


- Siemens Issuing CA Internet Server 2016 (https://crt.sh/?caid=26087 ; 
chains to QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3) has issued certificates with 4-byte 
serial numbers with notBefores as recent as 11 July 2017, though they do 
not appear to be assigned sequentially.


D-Trust and QuoVadis both indicated no problems complying with version 
2.4.1 of Mozilla's certificate policies (which requires, among other 
things, 64 bits of serial number entropy) by 1 June 2017 when they 
replied to Mozilla's April CA communication. The Government of the 
Netherlands indicated they needed a delay for CPS translation only.


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Re: TunRootCA2 root inclusion request

2017-07-19 Thread Charles Reiss via dev-security-policy

On 07/19/17 05:10, Aaron Wu wrote:

- Tunisian Server Certificate Authority - TunServerCA2



https://crt.sh/?id=21813439 is a certificate issued by this CA which has 
a domain name in the common name but only an email address in the SAN. 
(The certificate has TLS server/client usage EKUs.)



https://crt.sh/?id=99182607 is a revoked certificate issued by this CA 
which has a domain name in the common name which does not match the 
domain name in the SAN, which is for a different TLD. (A new certificate 
with both names in SANs, https://crt.sh/?id=99462700 , has a notBefore 
which appears to have around the same timestamp as the revocation.)



https://crt.sh/?id=15126121 is an expired certificate (notBefore March 
2016; notAfter March 2017) issued by this CA which has a wildcard name 
in the common name while the SAN contains specific domain names that 
would be covered by the wildcard only.



https://crt.sh/?id=10975511 is an expired certificate with a notBefore 
of Oct 2015 and notAfter of Oct 2016 issued by this CA with an iPAddress 
SAN of 127.0.0.1. (I believe that by 2014, the BRs prohibited issuing 
internal name certs with validity past November 2015.)

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Re: TunRootCA2 root inclusion request

2017-07-19 Thread Charles Reiss via dev-security-policy

On 07/19/2017 05:10 AM, Aaron Wu wrote:

- Tunisian Server Certificate Authority - TunServerCA2


https://crt.sh/?id=79470561&opt=cablint is a certificate for the 
internal name 'adv-mail.calladvance.local' issued by this CA with a 
notBefore of 2017.

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Re: Certificate with invalid dnsName

2017-07-19 Thread Charles Reiss via dev-security-policy

On 07/19/2017 06:03 PM, Tom wrote:

Following that discovery, I've search for odd (invalid?) DNS names.
Here is the list of certificated I've found, it may overlap some 
discovery already reported.
If I'm correct, theses certificate are not revoked, not expired, and 
probably trusted by Mozilla (crt.sh issuer are marked trusted by 
Mozilla, but not all).



[snip]

Some additional problematic certs:

chains to Swisscom:
https://crt.sh/?id=175444569  wxadm.swissucc.local

chains to CATCert, notBefore in 2017:
https://crt.sh/?id=98706307   maritim4.mmaritim.local

chains to PROCERT, notBefore in 2017:
https://crt.sh/?id=175466182  fospuca.local

chains to Baltimore Cybertrust Root (DigiCert):
https://crt.sh/?id=12344381   lorweb.local

chains to Baltimore Cybertrust Root (DigiCert), notBefore in 2017:
https://crt.sh/?id=175469208  skbfep01.justica.local
https://crt.sh/?id=175469209  energy.ctd  and  pt

chains to QuoVadis, notBefore in 2017:
https://crt.sh/?id=175466199  devsrv.pe.siemens.info-com  (swapped -/.)

chains to DocuSign, notBefore in 2017:
https://crt.sh/?id=99149574   "www.immonotaireargus.com " (trailing space)
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Re: Certificate with invalid dnsName

2017-07-19 Thread Charles Reiss via dev-security-policy

On 07/19/2017 06:03 PM, Tom wrote:

Following that discovery, I've search for odd (invalid?) DNS names.
Here is the list of certificated I've found, it may overlap some 
discovery already reported.
If I'm correct, theses certificate are not revoked, not expired, and 
probably trusted by Mozilla (crt.sh issuer are marked trusted by 
Mozilla, but not all).


Annotating these certs:


Starting with *:


I believe this cert is presently untrusted by Mozilla due to revocation 
of all paths to the Federal PKI:

https://crt.sh/?id=7211484*eis.aetc.af.mil


chains to StartCom (and all of these from StartCom are minor compared to 
StartCom's other problems):

https://crt.sh/?id=10714112*g10.net-lab.net


chains to Baltimore CyberTrust Root (DigiCert):

https://crt.sh/?id=48682944*nuvolaitaliana.it


chains to StartCom:

https://crt.sh/?id=15736178*assets.blog.cn.net.ru
https://crt.sh/?id=17295812*dev02.calendar42.com
https://crt.sh/?id=15881220*dev.1septem.ru
https://crt.sh/?id=15655700*assets.blog.cn.net.ru
https://crt.sh/?id=17792808*quickbuild.raptorengineering.io





Starting with -:


chains to QuoVadis:
https://crt.sh/?id=54285413
-d1-datacentre-12g-console-2.its.deakin.edu.au


chains to StartCom:

https://crt.sh/?id=78248795-1ccenter.777chao.com





Multiple *.:


chains to QuoVadis:

https://crt.sh/?id=13299376*.*.victoria.ac.nz


I believe this cert is presently trusted by Mozilla only via a 
technically constrained subCA:

https://crt.sh/?id=44997156*.*.rnd.unicredit.it


chains to Swisscom:

https://crt.sh/?id=5982951*.*.int.swisscom.ch





Internals TLD:


chains to Baltimore CyberTrust Root (DigiCert):

https://crt.sh/?id=33626750a1.verizon.test


I believe this cert is presently untrusted by Mozilla due to revocation 
of the relevant subCA:

https://crt.sh/?id=33123653DAC38997VPN2001A.trmk.corp


chains to Certplus (DocuSign):

https://crt.sh/?id=42475510naccez.us.areva.corp


I believe these presently lack an unrevoked, unexpired trust path in 
Mozilla:

https://crt.sh/?id=10621703collaboration.intra.airbusds.corp
https://crt.sh/?id=48726306zdeasaotn01.dsmain.ds.corp

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Re: Certificate with invalid dnsName issued from Baltimore intermediate

2017-07-23 Thread Charles Reiss via dev-security-policy

On 07/17/2017 11:21 AM, Ben Wilson wrote:

Dear Jonathan,

Thank you for bringing this to our attention.  We have contacted Intesa 
Sanpaolo regarding this error and have asked them to correct it as soon as 
possible.
Sincerely yours,


This CA also issued a recent certificate for the unqualified dNSName 
'webinterfacestrong': https://crt.sh/?id=177606495

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