Loosen the interpretation of escrow from a box surrounded by KRAs, KROs, and
access controls with a rolling LTSK and escrow could describe what many white
glove and CDN tier hosting operations do. The CDN has written consent, but the
end customer never touches the TLS cert.
> -Original
We are not making any changes at this time.
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Adrian R. via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Friday, September 01, 2017 4:09 AM
> To:
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Devon O'Brien via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 12:24 PM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
>
1) December 1, 2017 is the earliest credible date that any RFP respondent
can provide the Managed CA solution proposed by Google, assuming a start date
of August 1, 2017. Only one RFP respondent initially proposed a schedule
targeting August 8, 2017 (assuming a start date of June 12,
...@konklone.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 3:43 PM
To: Steve Medin <steve_me...@symantec.com>
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: [EXT] Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:31 AM, Steve Medin via dev-security-policy
<dev-securi
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> David E. Ross via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 12:48 PM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject:
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 12:22 PM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re:
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2017 4:39 PM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re:
age-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Steve Medin via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Tuesday, July 18, 2017 2:23 PM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: [EXT] Sym
*Progress Update on SubCA RFP, Partner Selection, and Execution*
Since June 1, Symantec has worked in earnest to operationalize the SubCA
proposal outlined by Google and Mozilla and discussed in community forums. The
core of this proposal is to transfer the authentication and issuance of
> -Original Message-
> From: Gervase Markham [mailto:g...@mozilla.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2017 2:51 PM
> To: Steve Medin ; mozilla-dev-security-
> pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Cc: Kathleen Wilson
> Subject: [EXT] Mozilla requirements
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Friday, June 02, 2017 10:54 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject:
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Friday, May 19, 2017 11:42 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject:
Replacement link: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8867892
Sorry, I had the PDF cached.
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> urijah--- via dev-security-policy
>
Symantec logs TLS server certificates that are intended to be trusted by Chrome
to Certificate Transparency logs. Symantec does not systematically log other
certificate types to CT, including Class 1, Class 2 and other types of user
certificates.
The Adobe Approved Trust List intermediate CA
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Ryan
> Sleevi via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2017 6:50 PM
> To: Ryan Sleevi
> Cc:
Gerv,
Our response to the recent questions is posted at:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8867735
Kind regards,
Steve
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Gervase
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Monday, May 01, 2017 10:16 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject:
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> wizard--- via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Tuesday, May 02, 2017 7:10 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: [EXT]
Gerv- Thank you for the thoughtful analysis. We are reviewing and intend to
respond to your latest proposal shortly.
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Gervase Markham via
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Friday, April 21, 2017 6:17 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject:
> -Original Message-
> From: Gervase Markham [mailto:g...@mozilla.org]
> Sent: Tuesday, April 11, 2017 6:42 AM
> To: Steve Medin ; Rick Andrews
> ; mozilla-dev-security-
> pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: [EXT] Re: Questions for
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Tuesday, April 04, 2017 9:06 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject:
> -Original Message-
> From: Gervase Markham [mailto:g...@mozilla.org]
> Sent: Thursday, April 13, 2017 9:13 AM
> To: Steve Medin ; Rick Andrews
> ; mozilla-dev-security-
> pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: [EXT] Re: Questions for
Gerv,
In the interest of an easy to read set of responses to your questions and many
submitted in response to our recent posts, we have prepared a PDF and attached
it to the Bugzilla tracking this discussion.
That PDF is available at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8860216.
>
Issue X: Incomplete RA Program Remediation (February - March 2017)
The only Symantec RAs capable of authorizing and issuing publicly trusted
SSL/TLS certificates are: CrossCert, Certisign, Certsuperior and Certisur.
Symantec continues to maintain a partner program for non-TLS certificates.
Issue T: RA Program Misissuances (January 2010 - January 2017)
Program Background:
Symantec has operated an RA program designed to deliver a superior customer
experience in global markets where language skills, understanding of local
business requirements, and physical local presence are
Issue V: RA Program Audit Issues (2013 or earlier - January 2017)
Symantec has had two different programs that involve delegated third parties
associated with publicly trusted TLS and subject to third-party audits: our
GeoRoot program and our RA/Affiliate program.
GeoRoot refers to our program
Issue R: Insecure Issuance API (2013 or earlier - November 2016)
In April 2015, security consultant Chris Byrne responsibly disclosed two
potential vulnerabilities related to our Quick Invite feature, which enables a
reseller to invite pre-selected customers to enroll for certificates, via
Issue P: UniCredit Sub CA Failing To Follow BRs (April - October 2016)
We are committed to keeping our customers, partners and ecosystem informed and
taking action when necessary. We recognize that there are issues we are
accountable for, such as our March 2016 CA Communication response
Issue Q: Symantec Audit Issues 2016 (December 2015 - November 2016)
In our 2014-2015 audits, certain issues were identified that we promptly took
action on, including addressing the test certificate incident. We continued
these efforts until the Point in Time audit was conducted. We split the
Issue L: Cross-Signing the US Federal Bridge (February 2011 - July 2016)
Symantec, as well as VeriSign, has participated in the FPKI since 2006, and we
take our responsibility as a participant of this program very seriously. When
Symantec began participating in FPKI, FPKI rules required two-way
Issue N: Premature Manual Signing Using SHA-1 (July 2016)
This matter represents the first time any CA attempted to follow the exception
process which was developed over the course of weeks, beginning at the Bilbao
CABF face-to-face meeting in May 2016, and with the input of our partners.
Issue E: Domain Validation Vulnerability (October 2015)
With respect to Issue E, Symantec has no additional comments regarding the
perspective outlined in the summary. Please see
Issue H: SHA-1 Issuance After Deadline (January 2016)
With respect to Issue H, Symantec has no additional comments regarding the
perspective outlined in the summary. Please see
https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-January/006519.html for further
detail on Symantec's previous commentary
Issue B: 1024-bit Certificate Issued Directly From Root (Dec 2013 - Jan
2014)
The customer in question informed us of an issue in December 2013 that
threatened to seriously disrupt their primary business, and they sought our
assistance. The customer's non-browser implementation required a
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Peter
> Gutmann via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Friday, March 10, 2017 4:15 AM
> To: Gervase Markham ; Peter Kurrasch
>
In the case of CrossCert, where we have evidence of failure to properly
document their work, we are NOT relying on their previous work and have begun
fully revalidating all active certificates. In the cases of the other 3 RAs,
our focus is reviewing all of the work previously done to verify
dit Letter(s) used for each RA partner
since the acquisition by Symantec of the VeriSign Trust Services business in
2010.
On Fri, Feb 17, 2017 at 8:32 PM, Steve Medin via dev-security-policy
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org<mailto:dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org>&g
Our third response to questions, including these two below, is posted at
Bugzilla, and directly at
https://bug1334377.bmoattachments.org/attachment.cgi?id=8838825.
From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:r...@sleevi.com]
Sent: Friday, February 17, 2017 6:54 PM
To: Ryan Sleevi
Cc:
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Nick
> Lamb via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 12:14 PM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject:
Top comments for readability.
- IT professionals, server administrators, are humans, often
overworked, who need care, assistance, and attention. In my past version, I
offered helpdesk to helpdesk support and lost business that demanded helpdesk
to end user server admin.
-
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Nick
> Lamb via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Monday, February 13, 2017 6:37 PM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> Subject: Re:
rmediates Supporting Many EE Certs
>
> On 13/02/2017 18:25, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy wrote:
> > On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 8:17 AM, Steve Medin via dev-security-policy <
> > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> >
> >> Getting all user
> -Original Message-
> From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-
> bounces+steve_medin=symantec@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of
> Gervase Markham via dev-security-policy
> Sent: Monday, February 13, 2017 7:23 AM
> To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
>
A response is now available in Bugzilla 1334377 and directly at:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8836487
> -Original Message-
> From: Gervase Markham [mailto:g...@mozilla.org]
> Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2017 4:56 AM
> To: Steve Medin ;
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