Re: Subscriber Certificate Structure

2018-03-15 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Hi Ryan, thanks for your reply I'm afraid I didn't make my question clear enough or that i was missing something in the link you sent to me what I am asking is this: in a subscriber certificate under subject every CA i saw puts a CN=domain name what I understand from the BR is that the best

Subscriber Certificate Structure

2018-03-08 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Hi everyone, I tried to dive into the best certificate structure and there are two things that bother me: In both the CA\B F BR and the EV guidelines it clearly states that the SubjectCN is deprecated, so I learn from that that the best subscriber certificate structure would simply not

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-02-19 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Dear Wayne, What is the decision on our matter? Can we start the new Root process (new Certificate with new KeyPair and the new CA software) and proceed the inclusion from this point later? Our next steps will be to create all the above and disclose all the needed audits as required by Mozilla

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-02-14 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Dear Wayne We do understand the issues raised and instead of addressing each one separately we would give a shorter answer: We do agree that mistakes were made with this rootCA and we understand your hesitation. We also believe that our current CPS state is well and that we made a lot of

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-02-14 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Dear Ryan We need to refer to the points you have raised regarding the ROOT KEY – we must stress that the ROOT KEY and the ROOT CA are two different and separate entities. Whilst the ROOT CA does have some history the ROOT KEY was never (and shouldn’t be) in question. “I hope you can

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-02-12 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Dear Ryan, with all due respect and we do respect you, back in 2016 all the issues you mentioned were about the CPS and were corrected. It took us a lot to create the documentation you've asked for. There was no mentioning of any kind about our CA software or anything about the root itself. We

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-02-12 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Hi Wayne, Please realize our situation versus the Israeli market. We are the major certificate authority and we comply with every piece of local regulation, we are also members of international forums and trying to establish a CA in the UK with a new "international" root (Comsign

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-02-07 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Hi Wyane, resopnding to your notes: Section 4.9 states that in any case that Comsign is notified about a misissuance (no matter if it was notified by a subscriber or in any other way) Comsign shall revoke the certificate. It is true that we didn’t update the version number and we have

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-02-06 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
uot;For the handling of revocation requests by other than the Subscriber or his/her representative, refer to Section ‎4.9 below." > Cheers, > Julien > > On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 4:23 PM, YairE via dev-security-policy < > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-02-05 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Hi, thank you for pointing the above Here is our response: Section 1.3.2.5 We have corrected our CPS now that only limited actions could be performed by DTP's And they cannot perform domain validation. Section 3.2.2.4 We are aware of the problems with the methods that have been raised, we

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-01-29 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Hi Ryan, I noticed that your notes refer to a previous version of the CPS and not the current one here is a link to the current version which is 4.1. https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/comsign/CPS/CPS_4.1_eng.pdf About the CA software – we are now under auditing for our new Microsoft CA and

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2018-01-23 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
On Monday, January 22, 2018 at 9:32:13 PM UTC+2, Wayne Thayer wrote: > Today I noticed the following ComSign response to question 6 [1] in > Mozilla's November 2017 CA Communication: > > We are in the process of perfecting our CAA system. As far as I know we do > > not have a devoted mailbox for

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2017-12-24 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Hi Wayne, as requested i added the file with the certificates issued since 26/10/2014 until 31/03/2015 to the bug, Back then it seems we didn’t have a WebTrust audit (I believe we started in 2015) but only external CPA and governmental audits as are attached already. The reason we didn’t have

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2017-12-19 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Thank you again, On section 1 - we now added links to the current BR etc, and removed the "annual" update so we are bound to update anytime a new version is released. About the homograph spoofing - we have changed the section so now it tells its only automatic (because as you have pointed,

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2017-12-10 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Thank you for your notes, Here are the answers to your points. all the "bad" points about the CPS were addressed: Both CPS's are now changed to ver 4.1 section 1 states that we are addressing the latest BR 3.2.2.4 was corrected i'm also attaching the new CPS'es so you can review them About the

Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2017-12-10 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Thank you for your notes, Here are the answers to your points. all the "bad" points about the CPS were addressed: Both CPS'es are changed to ver 4.1 section 1 states that we are addressing the *latest* BR 3.2.2.4 was corrected the CPS'es in our site has been updated I’m attaching the new CPS'es