Re: Status of the bugzilla bug list

Good subject. I am, as ordinary user still dont know, can I trust of root certs of Entrust or no because this question more than 1 time opened in CA/Incident Dashboard under mark 'trust'. ...Now this bugs I can no search. ___ dev-security-policy

Re: COVID-19 Policy (especially EKU Deadline of 1-July-2020)

Hello Ben, What CA you present here? Andrew. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Re: DarkMatter Concerns

As an ordinary user from.Russia, I am very glad that DarkMatter is rejected in this thread. If for example there are complaints about some kind of plastic surgeon, then it is better to refuse the operation than to immediately start trying on yourself having believed his documents and risking to

Re: DarkMatter Concerns

It seems to me that the acceptance of this root can cause great damage to Mozilla to the future and cause great discussions in the Linux community. Is Mozilla ready to do all this and lose the support of a large number of users in the future? In my opinion these are the main issues.

Re: Request to Include Hongkong Post Root CA 3

Concern is that the incident report was submitted only when it required the inclusion of the new root certificate in Mozilla Root Store... ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

Re: Transfer of QuoVadis to DigiCert

"qwacs"? Sorry, what is it? ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

RE: Transfer of QuoVadis to DigiCert

Hello, Do you have planned to remove the QuoVadis Root certificates and use Digicert Root certificates for intermediate certs of QuoVadis or no? Thanks. Andrew (Russia) ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

Re: Test website monitor

This URL ( https://crt.sh/test-websites ) does not work (~5 days) ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Re: Incident report D-TRUST: syntax error in one tls certificate

Hello, D-TRUST will removed in the future or is this the last Chinese warning? :) Andrew. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

If Google had not started the process of Symantec distrust, Mozilla would never have come to this step, I think. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Re: How harsh (in general) should Mozilla be towards CAs?

I think that punishments of the CAs for already exists in Mozilla Root Store are very mild, and some CAs often do not pay any attention to this... ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

Re: Request to Include SHECA UCA Global G2 Root and UCA Extended Validation Root

Quote: * Root Certificate Download URL: Extended Validation Root: http://www.sheca.com/download/getdownloadforpdf/73 Hello, At this URL - 404 Not found. Sincerely, Andrew. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

Re: No Russian CAs

There is simply no market of CAs in Russia. But if this market be appeared, it is unlikely that he would enjoy the trust of ordinary web users: please read Yarovaya's Law (surveillance and web logging in the WWW of Russia up to 6 monts) Sincerely, Andrew (Russia)

No Russian CAs

Hello Caju Mihai, Because in Russia there are no significant and notable CAs. Usually only foreign CAs are used. Sincerely, Andrew (Russia) ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

Re: Certigna Root Renewal Request

Hello, This request will be rejected or will be pending? Enjoy, Andrew. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Re: c=US policy layer in development

I do not understand this secrecy for reading anyway. Andrew ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

c=US policy layer in development

If Mozilla develops an open product, then why are some discussions unavailable to users even for reading? (I'm not sure that this will protect against the PRISM intelligence system inside Google groups, so you have secrets from random users?) ___

Re: AC Camerfirma Chambers of Commerce and Global Chambersign 2016 Root Inclusion Request

Hi, Ramiro. But how will the problems persecuting your CA disappear, even if the root is sterile. Andrew ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Re: Process of including ca root in mozilla

It's bad that 70% of the root certificates in the discussion thread are certificates of governments that are not needed to anyone except these governments. Andrew ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

Re: Need remove OISTE WISeKey Global Root GA CA?

Pedro, The link in the first post says that the root OISTE WISeKey Global Root GB CA will replace OISTE WISeKey GA CA after adding "GB CA" in Mozilla Root Store. Now the third root "GC CA" is under consideration... I'm sorry if I misunderstood something. Andrew

Need remove OISTE WISeKey Global Root GA CA?

https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1172819#c9 I tested the root certificate is OISTE WISeKey Global Root GA CA on gov.sc websites and it does not work anymore: red SSL icon is displayed. I contacted with WISeKey via i...@wisekey.com one week ago on this issue, but the answer was

Re: Public trust of VISA's CA

It seems to me that some CA's hold unanswered Mozilla's questions because they know that it will not cause any serious consequences. I mean removing a root certificates from Mozilla Root Store. However, this point of view here seems to have already been voiced.

Re: Mozilla’s Plan for Symantec Roots

Also, it should be understood that on Linux OS no transitional periods will be made, but simply to removes all Symantec certificates from a certain date. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

RE: Possible future re-application from WoSign (now WoTrus)

Here it is also a question of a dangerous precedent. Should Mozilla always forgive all bad CA in the future and take a formal approach to security? ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

Re: Swiss Government root inclusion request

Hello Wayne, At me the link on the pdf file is work correctly from Google Chrome ver. 49, but I cannot load this file in my post... ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

Acquisition policy (was: Francisco Partners acquires Comodo certificate authority business)

Hello Peter, But what prevents Francisco Partners making security nightmare after the probationary period? This is logical, I think. Regards, Andrew ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org

RE: Francisco Partners acquires Comodo certificate authority business

Hello, Why you're removed the post of Peter Gutmann (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:08)? If I understand correctly, at the time of the public discussion for new root certificates SSL.com (RA Comodo) Mozilla concealed information about the acquisition of SSL business of Comodo and that now the past public

Re: SecureTrust

Hello David, If I understand correctly, these 3 root certificates of TrustVawe were not deleted: https://ccadb-public.secure.force.com/mozilla/IncludedCACertificateReport (see bottom part) ___ dev-security-policy mailing list