On 24/12/2016 14:33, i...@binarus.de wrote:
...
I had some private communication with a very helpful and experienced
> person in the meantime, and he detailed to me that no Linux
> Distribution (possibly with one exception) uses an OpenSSL version
> which supports X25519. Furthermore, the
Am Samstag, 24. Dezember 2016 02:15:35 UTC+1 schrieb Yuhong Bao:
> AFAIK one of the reasons DHE was dropped was that 1024-bit DHE was common.
> Java used to hardcode 768-bit DHE.
This is a good point.
Nevertheless, when using DHE, I always have been doing so with DH params I have
generated
Am Samstag, 24. Dezember 2016 05:21:34 UTC+1 schrieb Peter Gutmann:
> Eric Rescorla writes:
>
> >I don't think this really accurately reflects the consensus of the security
> >community
>
> Or of any community AFAIK. Perhaps there could be a special version of
> Firefox that uses one-time pads
Eric Rescorla writes:
>I don't think this really accurately reflects the consensus of the security
>community
Or of any community AFAIK. Perhaps there could be a special version of
Firefox that uses one-time pads for everything, and on startup uses a
cryptographically secure
.de <i...@binarus.de>
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2016 4:41:48 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Firefox 50.1.0 still does not offer any secure SSL / TLS ciphers
Eric,
> Yes, I'm quite familiar with this document, which was an input to the CFRG
> process which was sel
Eric,
> Yes, I'm quite familiar with this document, which was an input to the CFRG
> process which was selecting a new curve (which resulted in X25519 and
> X448). As the NIST curves already existed, it really wouldn't be sensible
> to document requirements for selecting them.
>
> As far as the
[2016-12-23 19:11] i...@binarus.de:
In the meantime, I have downloaded and compiled OpenSSL 1.1.0c for my web
server. According to the following and many other articles, OpenSSL 1.1.x
should support ed25519 / x25519:
https://certsimple.com/blog/safe-curves-and-openssl
But if I do ./openssl
On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 10:02 AM, wrote:
> Eric,
>
> thanks for your help again.
>
> > > As far as I have understood, the consensus is that there are bad
> > > (insecure) ECs (those from NIST which seem to be intentionally
> weakened /
> > > broken by various tricks) and good
Kurt,
> Please note that for key exchange it's X25519. Ed25519 is for
> authentication.
thanks again for the valuable hint.
In the meantime, I have downloaded and compiled OpenSSL 1.1.0c for my web
server. According to the following and many other articles, OpenSSL 1.1.x
should support
Eric,
thanks for your help again.
> > As far as I have understood, the consensus is that there are bad
> > (insecure) ECs (those from NIST which seem to be intentionally weakened /
> > broken by various tricks) and good (secure) ECs (e.g. Ed25519).
> >
>
> I don't think this really accurately
On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 1:53 AM, wrote:
> Eric,
>
> > I don't believe that this claim reflects the consensus of the security
> > community.
>
> As far as I have understood, the consensus is that there are bad
> (insecure) ECs (those from NIST which seem to be intentionally
Eric,
> I don't believe that this claim reflects the consensus of the security
> community.
As far as I have understood, the consensus is that there are bad (insecure) ECs
(those from NIST which seem to be intentionally weakened / broken by various
tricks) and good (secure) ECs (e.g.
Kurt, thank you very much for your illuminating answer.
> For the key exchange there are options like X25519 and X448. As far as I
> know, there is nothing suspicious about them. Firefox offers X25519 as
> the first curve.
> [...]
> For the authentication there will be Ed25519 and Ed448 in the
On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 11:58 PM, wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I already have reported the following issue in the bug tracking system and
> now have been told that the bug has been closed and that I should put it
> for discussion here.
>
> Please note that I am no way a security expert,
On 2016-12-22 08:58, i...@binarus.de wrote:
Hi all,
I already have reported the following issue in the bug tracking system and now
have been told that the bug has been closed and that I should put it for
discussion here.
Please note that I am no way a security expert, so please don't blame
Hi all,
I already have reported the following issue in the bug tracking system and now
have been told that the bug has been closed and that I should put it for
discussion here.
Please note that I am no way a security expert, so please don't blame me if the
following is wrong. But I am sort of
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