Re: PROCERT issuing certificates with non-random serial numbers
Just from the posted serial numbers, it looks almost like the high order bits may represent 32 bits of random, which is still far short of the requirement. Perhaps they intended a 48 bit sequential counter after a 32 bit random, or intended a 64 bit random followed by a 16 bit sequential counter, but failed at filling the second half of the 64 bit random space. ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
Re: PROCERT issuing certificates with non-random serial numbers
On Wed, 16 Aug 2017 19:56:45 -0700 Andrew Ayer via dev-security-policy wrote: > Every certificate known to CT issued by PROCERT with a notBefore > date after September 30, 2016 has what appears to be a non-random > serial number: https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25&iCAID=750 These are now being tracked on misissued.com: https://misissued.com/batch/12/ > In addition, their OCSP responder is returning a status of "Good" for > adjacent serial numbers, suggesting sequential assignment of serial > numbers. Actually, their OCSP responder is returning good for unissued certificates, which is itself a BR violation. I've attached a sample OCSP response to the bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1391058 Regards, Andrew ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
PROCERT issuing certificates with non-random serial numbers
Every certificate known to CT issued by PROCERT with a notBefore date after September 30, 2016 has what appears to be a non-random serial number: https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25&iCAID=750 1e:4d:94:48:00:00:00:00:0c:79 2f:84:26:06:00:00:00:00:0b:1b 3d:94:73:d1:00:00:00:00:0a:ab 4b:53:8c:18:00:00:00:00:09:db 4c:94:f1:d5:00:00:00:00:0a:bd 4c:f3:00:86:00:00:00:00:0a:c0 4d:a7:2c:6a:00:00:00:00:0a:c3 4e:11:32:b3:00:00:00:00:0a:c7 6f:d3:c3:24:00:00:00:00:0c:56 7b:33:8f:17:00:00:00:00:0c:96 7b:98:a8:b1:00:00:00:00:0c:97 11:bb:b9:9f:00:00:00:00:0b:af 14:e9:6d:a4:00:00:00:00:0a:fa 16:8e:a3:9d:00:00:00:00:0b:f5 17:93:5a:4f:00:00:00:00:09:a6 17:96:d7:b8:00:00:00:00:09:a7 18:94:8a:f4:00:00:00:00:09:5a 18:98:dc:bb:00:00:00:00:09:5b 35:ce:d9:af:00:00:00:00:0c:02 43:ed:d4:a7:00:00:00:00:0a:b1 51:33:c5:60:00:00:00:00:0a:36 62:fa:e6:81:00:00:00:00:08:ad 69:4d:2f:c1:00:00:00:00:08:b4 76:81:87:9b:00:00:00:00:0b:65 In addition, their OCSP responder is returning a status of "Good" for adjacent serial numbers, suggesting sequential assignment of serial numbers. This violates section of 7.1 of the BRs, which state: "Effective September 30, 2016, CAs SHALL generate non-sequential Certificate serial numbers greater than zero (0) containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG." I have not reported this to PROCERT since their problem reporting mechanism is a link to a non-English web page. Regards, Andrew ___ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
