Re: 2018.03.12 Let's Encrypt Wildcard Certificate Encoding Issue

2018-03-15 Thread Tom via dev-security-policy
Le 15/03/2018 à 20:04, Wayne Thayer a écrit : This incident, and the resulting action to "integrate GlobalSign's certlint and/or zlint into our existing cert-checker pipeline" has been documented in bug 1446080 [1] This is further proof that pre-issuance TBS certificate linting (either by

Re: 2018.03.12 Let's Encrypt Wildcard Certificate Encoding Issue

2018-03-15 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
This incident, and the resulting action to "integrate GlobalSign's certlint and/or zlint into our existing cert-checker pipeline" has been documented in bug 1446080 [1] This is further proof that pre-issuance TBS certificate linting (either by incorporating existing tools or using a comprehensive

Re: 2018.03.12 Let's Encrypt Wildcard Certificate Encoding Issue

2018-03-15 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 12:22 PM, Tom via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Should another bug be opened for the certificate issued by IdenTrust with > apparently the same encoding problem? > > Yes - this is bug 1446121 (

Re: TunRootCA2 root inclusion request

2018-03-15 Thread Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
I think this discussion has made it clear that the request for inclusion of the TunRootCA2 root should be denied. CAs inherently must be trusted, and trust must be earned. A CA can't simply fix one problem after another as we find them during the inclusion process and expect to be rewarded for

Mis-issuance of certificate with https in CN/SAN

2018-03-15 Thread Ben Wilson via dev-security-policy
This mis-issuance incident was reported by Cybertrust Japan (CTJ), an intermediate CA of DigiCert. (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1445857) Here's the incident report: 1.How your CA first became aware of the problem (e.g. via a problem report submitted to your Problem

Re: Mis-issuance of certificate with https in CN/SAN

2018-03-15 Thread Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy
On 16/03/2018 05:28, Ben Wilson wrote: This mis-issuance incident was reported by Cybertrust Japan (CTJ), an intermediate CA of DigiCert. (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1445857) Here's the incident report: 1.How your CA first became aware of the problem (e.g. via a

Re: TunRootCA2 root inclusion request

2018-03-15 Thread okaphone.elektronika--- via dev-security-policy
On Thursday, 15 March 2018 04:30:22 UTC+1, syri...@gmail.com wrote: > Dear Wayne, > Based on the long discussion regarding our request, I would appreciate having > your opinion on the following: > Move to a new root based on EJBCA (Enterprise License) and conduct a new > audit with a new

Re: Subscriber Certificate Structure

2018-03-15 Thread YairE via dev-security-policy
Hi Ryan, thanks for your reply I'm afraid I didn't make my question clear enough or that i was missing something in the link you sent to me what I am asking is this: in a subscriber certificate under subject every CA i saw puts a CN=domain name what I understand from the BR is that the best

Re: Subscriber Certificate Structure

2018-03-15 Thread Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy
On Thu, Mar 15, 2018 at 7:37 AM YairE via dev-security-policy < dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > Hi Ryan, thanks for your reply > > I'm afraid I didn't make my question clear enough or that i was missing > something in the link you sent to me > > what I am asking is this: > in a