I suggest to make the requirement „* The PKCS#12 file must have a sufficiently
secure password, and the password must be transferred via a separate channel
than the PKCS#12 file.” binding for both transfer methods and not be limited to
physical data storage.
Otherwise I agree with this
Am Montag, 30. April 2018 08:25:39 UTC+2 schrieb Buschart, Rufus:
> ---=== Intern ===---
> Hello!
>
> I would like to suggest to rephrase the central sentence a little bit:
>
> Original:
>
> CAs MUST NOT distribute or transfer certificates in PKCS#12 form through
> insecure electronic
Hi all,
a list of certificates showing a ROCA fingerprint was posted by Rob Stradling
at Mozilla.dev.security.policy on 2017/10/18 available at
https://misissued.com/batch/28/
This contains among other certificates a number of D-Trust related certificates
that all show a ROCA fingerprint.
This post links to https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1509512
syntax error in one tls certificate
1. How your CA first became aware of the problem (e.g. via a problem report
submitted to your Problem Reporting Mechanism, a discussion in
mozilla.dev.security.policy, a Bugzilla bug, or
Am Montag, 26. November 2018 18:34:38 UTC+1 schrieb Jakob Bohm:
> In addition to this, would you add the following:
>
> - Daily checks of crt.sh (or some other existing tool) if
> additional such certificates are erroneously issued before
> the automated countermeasures are in place?
Thank
1. How your CA first became aware of the problem (e.g. via a problem report
submitted to your Problem Reporting Mechanism, a discussion in
mozilla.dev.security.policy, a Bugzilla bug, or internal self-audit), and the
time and date.
2019-07-05, 04:29 UTC: Internal quality assurance noticed the
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