> On Aug 17, 2017, at 07:19, ramirommunoz--- via dev-security-policy
> wrote:
>
> https://crt.sh/?id=112929021=cablint
> is a precertificate. You can see the CT Precertificate Poison critical
> extention.
The serial number of this certificate should
El jueves, 17 de agosto de 2017, 12:26:05 (UTC+2), ramiro...@gmail.com
escribió:
> El martes, 15 de agosto de 2017, 15:13:04 (UTC+2), Gervase Markham escribió:
> > On 08/08/17 14:33, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> > > Following up on this thread, 8 days ago I emailed Camerfirma, I have not
> > > heard
El martes, 15 de agosto de 2017, 15:13:04 (UTC+2), Gervase Markham escribió:
> On 08/08/17 14:33, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> > Following up on this thread, 8 days ago I emailed Camerfirma, I have not
> > heard back from them, nor have they taken any action. What is the
> > appropriate next step here?
>
On 08/08/17 14:33, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> Following up on this thread, 8 days ago I emailed Camerfirma, I have not
> heard back from them, nor have they taken any action. What is the
> appropriate next step here?
I have emailed the primary Point of Contact at Camerfirma to enquire as
to what is
On 31/07/17 15:14, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> So far I've encountered issues with:
>
> - DocuSign (OpenTrust/Keynectis) - who neglected to fill out that field
> - StartCom - who filled out "web publication", I don't know what that means
I have emailed both of these CAs to request that they provide
Hi all,
Following up on this thread, 8 days ago I emailed Camerfirma, I have not
heard back from them, nor have they taken any action. What is the
appropriate next step here?
Alex
On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 10:14 AM, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> I've been attempting to report a
On 25/07/17 18:13, Jeremy Rowley wrote:
> I would also love to see a more standardized notice mechanism that is
> universal to all CAs. Right now, notifying CAs is a pain as some have
> different webforms, some use email, and some don't readily tell you how to
> contact them about certificate
+jeremy.rowley=digicert.com@lists.mozilla
.org] On Behalf Of Alex Gaynor via dev-security-policy
Sent: Tuesday, July 25, 2017 10:58 AM
To: Alex Gaynor <alex.gay...@gmail.com>
Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Miss-issuance: URI in dNSName SAN
Following up on this (and
On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 12:57:44PM -0400, Alex Gaynor via dev-security-policy
wrote:
> Following up on this (and really several other threads). The BRs require
> mis-issued certs to be revoked with 24 hours of the CA becoming aware. CAs
> are required to track m.d.s.p. per the Mozilla Root
Following up on this (and really several other threads). The BRs require
mis-issued certs to be revoked with 24 hours of the CA becoming aware. CAs
are required to track m.d.s.p. per the Mozilla Root Policy, so really
notifying this list _ought_ to qualify as notifying the CAs.
In any event, here
On Fri, Jul 21, 2017 at 4:04 AM ramirommunoz--- via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> El jueves, 20 de julio de 2017, 16:49:15 (UTC+2), Gervase Markham
> escribió:
> > On 19/07/17 14:53, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> > > I'd like to report the following instance of
El jueves, 20 de julio de 2017, 16:49:15 (UTC+2), Gervase Markham escribió:
> On 19/07/17 14:53, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> > I'd like to report the following instance of miss-issuance:
>
> Thank you. Again, I have drawn this message to the attention of the CAs
> concerned (Government of Venezuela and
On 19/07/17 14:53, Alex Gaynor wrote:
> I'd like to report the following instance of miss-issuance:
Thank you. Again, I have drawn this message to the attention of the CAs
concerned (Government of Venezuela and Camerfirma).
Gerv
___
dev-security-policy
13 matches
Mail list logo