Hi Jakob,
Your below description raises two questions of general interest (though not of
interest to the Mozilla root program):
1. Will DigiCert establish cross-signatures from the old/historic
Symantec roots to continuing DigiCert roots and subCAs?
[JR] We won’t be cross-signing from
en via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 12:24 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: [EXT] Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal
Hello m.d.s.p.,
I'd just like to give the community a heads up that Chrome’s plan
remains to put up a blog post echoing
, 2017 9:12 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal
Steve,
Thank you for responding relatively promptly (at least as compared to previous
Symantec responses) to Devon's questions.
However, these responses seem to imply that a side effect
One good thing we should be able to hope for from a change in ownership even if
the personnel and equipment are the same or a great deal in common: improved
management oversight. In my view the most worrying underlying problem at
Symantec was the inadequate oversight. Senior management at the
; > Devon O'Brien via dev-security-policy
> > Sent: Wednesday, August 09, 2017 12:24 PM
> > To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
> > Subject: [EXT] Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal
> >
> > Hello m.d.s.p.,
> >
> > I'd just like to give
illa.org
> Subject: [EXT] Re: Symantec Update on SubCA Proposal
>
> Hello m.d.s.p.,
>
> I'd just like to give the community a heads up that Chrome’s plan remains to
> put up a blog post echoing our recent announcement on blink-dev [1], but
> in the meantime, we are reviewi
Hello m.d.s.p.,
I'd just like to give the community a heads up that Chrome’s plan remains to
put up a blog post echoing our recent announcement on blink-dev [1], but in the
meantime, we are reviewing the facts related to Symantec’s sale of their PKI
business to DigiCert [2].
Recently, it has
Just to be explicit: your count includes certificates which, with high
probability have already been replaced, because it does not subtract names
for which new certificates have been issued?
I realize it may seem like I'm putting a lot of emphasis on this one
number, but given that it's the basis
On 25/07/2017 22:28, Rick Andrews wrote:
...
You are correct in that most customers are indeed not prepared to
deal with potential crises in the SSL system. We have all witnessed
this first hand with Heartbleed, the replacement of SHA1
certificates, etc. A four month replacement window for a
On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 4:28 PM, Rick Andrews via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
> Symantec has proposed timing changes that are consistent with the scope of
> distrust of the original SubCA proposal as proposed by Google and endorsed
> by Mozilla, which
On Tuesday, 25 July 2017 21:29:06 UTC+1, Rick Andrews wrote:
> The details of this process would probably be best served in a separate
> thread. Essentially, such a process would involve a quick assessment by the
> community on the context and merits of the request by the customer
You want us
Hi Rick,
Some more thoughts on your post. I continue to invite community
commentary on the issues we are discussing.
On 21/07/17 07:00, Rick Andrews wrote:
> In our June 1 post, we stated that we would update the community after the
> end of the month.
Indeed. I was more referring to the
On 21/07/17 07:00, Rick Andrews wrote:
> In light of all of these implications, we respectfully request that Mozilla,
> Google and the community consider the dates Symantec has proposed, which are
> the results of our earnest and extensive efforts to implement the spirit of
> the SubCA
On Thursday, July 20, 2017 at 12:31:56 PM UTC-7, Gervase Markham wrote:
> Hi Steve,
>
> Thanks for posting this. I appreciate the level of detail provided,
> which is useful in giving us a basis for discussion. It's a little
> regrettable, though, that it was published a couple of weeks after we
Hi Steve,
Thanks for posting this. I appreciate the level of detail provided,
which is useful in giving us a basis for discussion. It's a little
regrettable, though, that it was published a couple of weeks after we
were led to expect it...
One note before we start: Symantec's business dealings
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