Because you're assuming that everything that occurs in this world
exists in a corporate environment, Eddy. That is the environment
where CAs flourish, where CAs thrive, where CAs can do what they're
best at -- *because all authority and trust trickles down from the
corporation, a tool used to help
On 11/08/2008 10:50 PM, Kyle Hamilton:
I would have no problem with changing the chrome when people step
outside of the assurances that Firefox tries to provide. I /do/ have
a problem with removing the ability for users to try to self-organize
their own networks. (The threat model is different,
Kyle Hamilton wrote:
The basic idea for querying this would be as follows: hash the Subject
and each/all SANs in the certificate, and query for that hash (perhaps
to a web service). If there's a match,
Would I as an attacker use a perfect Subject / SAN that would leave
itself easily matcha
There are two ways to target MITM attacks.
First is the attack against the user, sending everything destined for
TLS (either via HTTP proxy or via port-fowarding techniques) from the
user's machine to the attacker.
Second is the attack against the server, sending network traffic
destined for the s
4 matches
Mail list logo
