Re: Policy: revoke on private key exposure

2009-01-25 Thread Florian Weimer
* Eddy Nigg: On 01/22/2009 11:59 AM, Florian Weimer: http://lxr.mozilla.org/mozilla/source/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt The list doesn't include sub-CAs, which are equivalent to listed CAs for all practical purposes. Well, if you ping a web site then you'll most likely also

Re: Policy: revoke on private key exposure

2009-01-25 Thread Florian Weimer
* Ian G.: Huh? Typical CA policies explicitly state that subscriber certificates are not confidential, and are not treated as such by the CA (so that they can be used by marketing, for instance). What I know of, not exclusive or reliable: 1. privacy, as Eddy has pointed out. The reason

Re: Policy: revoke on private key exposure

2009-01-25 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 01/25/2009 11:02 PM, Florian Weimer: The Mozilla-listed CA does not know which certificates have been issued if there's an intermediate CA. Mozilla does not know which intermediate CAs exist. So there's not much room for proactive action. You can only run after individual certificates.