Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-15 Thread Florian Weimer
* Alaric Dailey: DNSSEC is an assertion of validitity of the DNS. EV certs assert that the business behind the cert is legit. Only that a legal entity exists (whether its legitimate is not checked). EV certificates are routinely issued to organizations which do not run the business which

Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-15 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 11/15/2008 05:19 PM, Florian Weimer: * Alaric Dailey: DNSSEC is an assertion of validitity of the DNS. EV certs assert that the business behind the cert is legit. Only that a legal entity exists (whether its legitimate is not checked). EV certificates are routinely issued to

Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-15 Thread Wes Kussmaul
Eddy Nigg wrote: On 11/15/2008 05:19 PM, Florian Weimer: * Alaric Dailey: DNSSEC is an assertion of validitity of the DNS. EV certs assert that the business behind the cert is legit. Only that a legal entity exists (whether its legitimate is not checked). EV certificates are routinely

Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-15 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 11/15/2008 05:57 PM, Wes Kussmaul: Eddy Nigg wrote: On 11/15/2008 05:19 PM, Florian Weimer: * Alaric Dailey: DNSSEC is an assertion of validitity of the DNS. EV certs assert that the business behind the cert is legit. Only that a legal entity exists (whether its legitimate is not

Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-15 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 8:20 PM +0200 11/15/08, Eddy Nigg wrote: Lets stay focused! This thread started off with a purported newbie having a problem with seeing self-signed certs where she shouldn't have. It then morphed into a discussion of security UI design. Then it went to what users shold and should not be

Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-15 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 11/15/2008 10:04 PM, Paul Hoffman: At 8:20 PM +0200 11/15/08, Eddy Nigg wrote: Lets stay focused! This thread started off with a purported newbie having a problem with seeing self-signed certs where she shouldn't have. It then morphed into a discussion of security UI design. Then it went

Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-10 Thread Nelson Bolyard
Anders Rundgren wrote: I haven't followed this lengthy discussion in detail but I have for a long time wondered how DNSSEC and SSL-CA-Certs should coexist. Which one will be the most authoritative? Could DNSSEC (if it finally succeeds) be the end of SSL-CA-certs? DNSSEC only attempts to

Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-10 Thread Eddy Nigg
On 11/10/2008 09:52 PM, Nelson Bolyard: Anders Rundgren wrote: I haven't followed this lengthy discussion in detail but I have for a long time wondered how DNSSEC and SSL-CA-Certs should coexist. Which one will be the most authoritative? Could DNSSEC (if it finally succeeds) be the end of

Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-10 Thread Graham Leggett
Nelson Bolyard wrote: I haven't followed this lengthy discussion in detail but I have for a long time wondered how DNSSEC and SSL-CA-Certs should coexist. Which one will be the most authoritative? Could DNSSEC (if it finally succeeds) be the end of SSL-CA-certs? DNSSEC only attempts to

RE: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-10 Thread Alaric Dailey
Subject: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild I haven't followed this lengthy discussion in detail but I have for a long time wondered how DNSSEC and SSL-CA-Certs should coexist. Which one will be the most authoritative? Could DNSSEC (if it finally succeeds) be the end of SSL-CA-certs? Anders

Re: DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-10 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 11:52 AM -0800 11/10/08, Nelson Bolyard wrote: DNSSEC only attempts to ensure that you get the (a) correct IP address. s/only/only currently/ You can stick any data you want in the DNS. Currently the most popular data is the A record (IP address) associated with a domain name, but is it

DNSSEC? Re: MITM in the wild

2008-11-09 Thread Anders Rundgren
I haven't followed this lengthy discussion in detail but I have for a long time wondered how DNSSEC and SSL-CA-Certs should coexist. Which one will be the most authoritative? Could DNSSEC (if it finally succeeds) be the end of SSL-CA-certs? Anders