Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Graham Leggett
David E. Ross wrote: I visit some Web sites with self-signed certificates. None of those sites request any input from me. The only reason they have site certificates is that the site owners want to show off how technically astute they are. Hah! However, those sites do indeed contain

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Ian G
Steffen Schulz wrote: On 081018 at 20:30, Nelson B Bolyard wrote: FF3 had utterly failed to convey to her any understanding that she was under attack. The mere fact that the browser provided a way to override the error was enough to convince her that the errors were not serious. I find it

Re: Microsec CA inclusion request

2008-10-19 Thread Kaspar Brand
Nelson B Bolyard wrote: Kaspar Brand wrote, On 2008-10-18 00:18: Nelson B Bolyard wrote: Yes. Bad response, ugly errors, no fun. With the default settings in Firefox 3, it isn't that bad... remember that it's the graceful failure mode which is selected by default: Don't forget the OCSP

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Kaspar Brand
Ian G wrote: Steffen Schulz wrote: I find it amazing that someone shows this level of ignorance but then manages to file a bugreport... :-) [...] play with compilers, flags, build own browser, To provide the output shown at the end of

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Ian G wrote, On 2008-10-19 05:09: Ian G wrote: Nelson B Bolyard wrote: KCM would not have helped. I agree, KCM would not have helped. In both cases, the warnings are delivered, and the user is given the responsibility for the overrides. I was thinking about this, and actually, KCM would

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Eddy Nigg wrote, On 2008-10-18 20:10: Requiring a change to about:config would facilitate your needs (because you have the knowledge to do both - change the config and know what it means), while still protecting the standard user who neither cares about security nor has any clue what

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Eddy Nigg
Nelson B Bolyard: Eddy Nigg wrote, On 2008-10-18 20:10: Requiring a change to about:config would facilitate your needs (because you have the knowledge to do both - change the config and know what it means), while still protecting the standard user who neither cares about security nor has any

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Ian G
Nelson B Bolyard wrote: Ian G wrote, On 2008-10-19 05:09: Ian G wrote: Nelson B Bolyard wrote: KCM would not have helped. I agree, KCM would not have helped. In both cases, the warnings are delivered, and the user is given the responsibility for the overrides. I was thinking about this,

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Eddy Nigg
Ian G: If the user does not validate, then she has done a bad thing. Yes, KCM would be at its weakest at that point, but no software tool is perfect; at some stage we have to ask the user, and then by definition the software is weak, dependent on the user. Chiming in here PKI wasn't

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Eddy Nigg
Eddy Nigg: PKI wasn't meant to facilitate certificates issued from random. PKI is mean disallow anything it doesn't know and doesn't chain to the root. In the browser we have many roots, but it's the browser fault to allow the user to ignore and click all th way through to heaven...or hell.

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Ian G wrote, On 2008-10-19 15:17: Nelson B Bolyard wrote: KCM would have accepted those certs without any complaint. Ahhh, not exactly! With KCM, it is not up to it to accept any certs any time: unfamiliar certs are passed up to the user for validation. Yes, but the users are

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Ian G wrote, On 2008-10-18 12:32: This is the pathological problem with MITM protection that has existed from day 1 of SSL: it was a solution in advance of a problem. Given that the solution was theoretical, and the problem had no practical existence (until recently), the solution could

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Ian G wrote, On 2008-10-19 05:50: [...] I would like to figure out a nice story that says use Firefox for all your general browsing ... but use for your online bank. I just don't know what is. As much as it pains me to say it, I agree. That is what is needed. This incident has

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Nelson B Bolyard
Nelson B Bolyard wrote, On 2008-10-19 19:03: Be careful not to confuse and conflict the MITM detection properties of SSL with the MITM resistance properties of the browser UI. s/conflict/conflate/ :( ___ dev-tech-crypto mailing list

Re: MITM in the wild

2008-10-19 Thread Eddy Nigg
Nelson B Bolyard: This incident has shown that FF3, with its all-too-easy-to-defeat MITM reporting, is NOT suitable for high-value web transactions such as online banking. FF3 is suitable for people on this list. It appears that it's not yet suitable for the average user. At least FF3