Re: [patch] Fix cross-user symlink race condition vulnerability

2012-10-31 Thread Christophe JAILLET
Le 31/10/2012 05:46, Eric Jacobs a écrit : There is a race condition vulnerability in httpd 2.2.23 (also present in previous releases) that allows a malicious user to serve arbitrary files from nearly anywhere on a server that isn't protected by strict os level permissions. In a shared hosting

Re: New feature request for balancer-manager: command line usage

2012-10-31 Thread Graham Leggett
On 30 Oct 2012, at 9:12 PM, John M jfm.apa...@gmail.com wrote: I have a new feature request for the balancer-manager: the ability to enable or disable servers in the balancer using the command line, instead of using the only way that exists that I know of: the balancer-manager webpage. The

Re: [patch] Fix cross-user symlink race condition vulnerability

2012-10-31 Thread Graham Leggett
On 31 Oct 2012, at 6:46 AM, Eric Jacobs ejac...@bluehost.com wrote: There is a race condition vulnerability in httpd 2.2.23 (also present in previous releases) that allows a malicious user to serve arbitrary files from nearly anywhere on a server that isn't protected by strict os level

Re: [patch] Fix cross-user symlink race condition vulnerability

2012-10-31 Thread Eric Covener
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Graham Leggett minf...@sharp.fm wrote: On 31 Oct 2012, at 6:46 AM, Eric Jacobs ejac...@bluehost.com wrote: There is a race condition vulnerability in httpd 2.2.23 (also present in previous releases) that allows a malicious user to serve arbitrary files from

Re: [patch] Fix cross-user symlink race condition vulnerability

2012-10-31 Thread Eric Jacobs
On 10/31/2012 06:00 AM, Eric Covener wrote: In general that is the proper form -- but this particular issue is documented as a limitation: Omitting this option should not be considered a security restriction, since symlink testing is subject to race conditions that make it circumventable.

Re: [patch] Fix cross-user symlink race condition vulnerability

2012-10-31 Thread Eric Covener
On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 3:36 PM, Eric Jacobs ejac...@bluehost.com wrote: On 10/31/2012 06:00 AM, Eric Covener wrote: In general that is the proper form -- but this particular issue is documented as a limitation: Omitting this option should not be considered a security restriction, since

conn_rec to request_rec

2012-10-31 Thread André Ferraz
Hi, i didnt find anywhere in the Docs, I know that the request_req has a pointer to the conn_rec of that request, but based on ap_hook_process_connection that only gives me the conn_rec it is possible to get the request_req if I only have the conn_rec ? []s

Re: conn_rec to request_rec

2012-10-31 Thread Nick Kew
On Wed, 31 Oct 2012 18:42:33 -0200 André Ferraz defer...@terra.com.br wrote: Hi, i didnt find anywhere in the Docs, I know that the request_req has a pointer to the conn_rec of that request, but based on ap_hook_process_connection that only gives me the conn_rec it is possible to

Re: When does Apache restart child processes

2012-10-31 Thread Eric Covener
It's possible this is because a burst of requests causes Apache to spin up child processes to handle them, but perhaps the load-test generation slows down at some point, Apache winds up with idle processes, and closes some down? Is that plausible?