; Zimmer, Vincent
> ; Rothman, Michael A
> ; Kinney, Michael D
>
> Cc: Sean Brogan
> Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule
> verification with secure boot keys
>
> Hi Liming Sun,
>
> Thank you for providing the additional details.
>
&
Sent: Monday, July 6, 2020 1:59 PM
> To: Kinney, Michael D ;
> devel@edk2.groups.io; Jiang, Guomin
> ; Xu, Wei6 ;
> Gao, Liming
> Cc: Sean Brogan
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance
> capsule verification with secure boot keys
>
> Thanks Michae
; Liming Sun ; Jiang, Guomin
> ; Xu, Wei6
> ; Gao, Liming ; Kinney, Michael D
>
> Cc: Sean Brogan
> Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule verification
> with secure boot keys
>
> Liming Sun,
>
> Can you explain why you cannot use PcdFmpDevice
>
> Cc: Sean Brogan
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance
> capsule verification with secure boot keys
>
> >> But if your customer indeed want it, you can add it
> to your customization code.
> Thanks. Yes, this is a behavior customer expects. This
&
@edk2.groups.io; Xu, Wei6
> ; Gao, Liming ;
> Kinney, Michael D
> Cc: Sean Brogan
> Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule verification
> with secure boot keys
>
> I want to ask your one question: are you sure that every mother board which
> de
Liming ; Kinney,
> Michael D
> Cc: Sean Brogan
> Subject: RE: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule
> verification with secure boot keys
>
> Thanks Guomin.
>
> I still have one question. Let's assume we're the device vendor and we let
> customer to enroll their ke
io; Liming Sun ; Xu, Wei6
> ; Gao, Liming ;
> Kinney, Michael D
> Cc: Sean Brogan
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule verification
> with secure boot keys
>
> Liming,
>
> The end user have the ability to enroll their DB without too m
: Sean Brogan
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH] FmpDevicePkg: Enhance capsule
> verification with secure boot keys
>
> Thanks Guomin for the comments!
>
> Below is the main scenario for the proposed change:
>
> - Device Manufacturer provides the devices with UEFI prein
I think it have some vulnerability, the case as below.
1. Untrusted End User enroll the new DB key -> sign the untrusted device
firmware -> flash the untrusted device firmware -> the system will become
unsafe.
I think the end user is untrusted and we need to make sure only few person can
have
