visibility or
amalgamation builds (that is, stuffing everything in a single C file;
-flto could perhaps provide an equivalent).
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
the baseline overhead from the run-time
system which is unavoidable, but that's fairly small for Python
(apparently less than 2 MB of unshared RSS per process).
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org
will fail with an attempt to redefine error.
(Don't get me wrong, LuaJIT is a great piece of work.)
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
-distribution
consistency shouldn't matter (as seen with git, for example).
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
On 01/07/2013 04:50 PM, Petr Pisar wrote:
The pre-precessed code is:
for (i = 0; i = LAST_FLAG; i++) {
((all_heap_codes *)(0x1000))-yap_flags_field[i] = 0;
}
I think the number of iterations (24) is one larger than the number of
array elements (23).
--
Florian Weimer / Red
is the best way to secure the
installation path. Theoretically, it is feasible, but it will always be
brittle. Those who cannot use Secure Boot (because they lack the
hardware or rely on kernel features disabled by Secure Boot) should have
access to a secure installation path, too.
--
Florian Weimer
/1
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
On 01/09/2013 02:34 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
On Wed, Jan 09, 2013 at 01:52:05PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
It just occurred to me that this has zero chance of working because
an attacker can always take the already-signed boot path from the
F18 installer and use that to boot a modified F19
.
I certainly welcome these efforts. At least one part of it (teaching
anaconda to verify (downloaded) packages against included key material)
will be required by any other solution.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https
be a Firefox add-on, for example,
to provide users with a trust root.)
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
, and some
alternatives don't, at least by default. This conversion is required
for protocol-compliant HTTP, and some web servers insist on CRLF line
endings.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org
it is built next week and 3 are not yet fixed gcc issues.
Does this mean that there were no build failures caused by C++
conformance fixes (accepts-invalid bugs)? That's pretty impressive.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
feature parity and things like DLZ modules have been ported from BIND 9.
BIND 10 is completely different from BIND 9. It's not like a switch
from BIND 9.7 to BIND 9.8, it's like going from BIND 8 to BIND 9.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel
.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
not work yet with separate debuginfo yet, I think.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
to offload the entire
certificate chain validation to a daemon, so that it's possible to get
consistent behavior across crypto libraries and allow system
administrators to specify more detailed policies (but please not as
Javascript code).
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
/Tips_and_Tricks/secure_getenv for
code snippets to implement in the change in a backwards-compatible
fashion. Unfortunately, glibc upstream insistent on renaming before
making the symbol official.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https
hurt.
The poll or the downloads themselves could set a cookie to override the
predicted preferences.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
On 01/28/2013 03:45 PM, Petr Pisar wrote:
On 2013-01-25, Florian Weimer fwei...@redhat.com wrote:
On 01/24/2013 12:30 PM, Stef Walter wrote:
So yes, as noted in the 'Detailed Description' of the feature, long term
we hope to follow this up with further work to make all the crypto
libraries
On 01/28/2013 06:31 PM, Bill Nottingham wrote:
Florian Weimer (fwei...@redhat.com) said:
See http://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/Tips_and_Tricks/secure_getenv
for code snippets to implement in the change in a
backwards-compatible fashion. Unfortunately, glibc upstream
insistent on renaming before
mock-chroot[root@oldenburg tmp]#
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
pages on fsf.org I don't see an upstream tracker for this.
Am I correct in assuming that it's Fedora specific?
Unclear. The test case in the bug report works for me on Fedora 18
x86_64 (and Fedora 19, too).
I suspect that before we can fix this, we need a better test case.
--
Florian Weimer
.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
. The networking stack is
more robust than the file system stack. (Which puts the idea to use
air-gapped machines and thumb drives for data transfer between them into
an interesting light, by the way.)
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel
(mod N) Diffie-Hellman?
Yes, it is.
And that's what is insanely slow?
I don't get it, either.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http
and produce wrong code.
In 64 bit mode, you should use the original version.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
://smani.fedorapeople.org/Xwin.c
case Expose:
if(last_event != Expose)
{ /* replot_(idev); */
XSetInputFocus(display,window,RevertToNone,CurrentTime); }
break;
As a first step, I would comment-in that replot_ call and see what happens.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security
(), though.
Can you provide more context?
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
volatile
(push %%ebx\n\t
cpuid\n\t
mov %%eax, (%0)\n\t
mov %%ebx, 4(%0)\n\t
mov %%ecx, 8(%0)\n\t
mov %%edx, 12(%0)\n\t
pop %%ebx
:
: S (r)
: eax, ecx, edx, memory);
}
Obviously, this needs adjustments to the callers.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product
On 09/12/2013 02:53 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:
By the way, we could generate much better code if the registers were
passed as an array or struct, so that they are in consecutive memory:
struct regs {
unsigned eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
};
void
cpuid(struct regs *r)
{
__asm volatile
(push
in such situations? Does the old
repository needs to be deleted before the new one is created?
Please do not reuse package names for unrelated software. It is quite
confusing and can interfere with all kinds of tracking/package mapping
efforts.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel
clobber as well (in the clobber section after yet another colon):
What would it do ? A compiler memory barrier ?
Correct.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code
.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
caching
functionality step by step instructions are available for:
Is there a write-up somewhere documenting what strategies are
implemented by bcache to keep the SSD and the hard disk contents in sync
even in the event of a sudden power loss?
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
benefits from prelinking today.
People write those, unfortunately.
I'm attaching a deliberately badly written script which should be fairly
representative, alas. I can' benchmark it right now because the system
isn't idle, but if someone else wants to have a go at it, be my guest.
--
Florian
6.5699
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
On 10/15/2013 10:04 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:
On 10/15/2013 09:10 PM, Chris Adams wrote:
Once upon a time, Jan Kratochvil jan.kratoch...@redhat.com said:
It depends, for example in this case prelink saves 33% of time (and
battery):
i=0;time while [ $i -lt 1000 ];do /usr/bin/gnome-open
-supplied copy. But in order to do that, we need a
canonical path.
Right now, iterating over /usr/share/automake*/config.{guess,sub} looks
most promising and would work on Debian as well.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https
On 10/15/2013 09:13 PM, Rolf Fokkens wrote:
On 10/14/2013 10:08 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
Is there a write-up somewhere documenting what strategies are
implemented by bcache to keep the SSD and the hard disk contents in
sync even in the event of a sudden power loss?
This is good place to start
packages with adequate provides in RHEL, or there should be
some RPM macro that expands to the proper dependency. It's probably not
a good idea to have every package to cook up its own solution.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
* مصعب الزعبي:
When any package have proxy word marked to (install or update) ,
error message will appear with http 403 error forbidden.
A curious problem. Could you use the repositories on
https://dl.fedoraproject.org/ instead?
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
* مصعب الزعبي:
Thank You for attention,
Yes they are all downloadable,
Good to know.
But only if I use https.
Yes, that is expected, considering yoru situation.
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of
* Gregory Maxwell:
The intention is that any parties capable of obtaining and running the
provided binaries (and they intended to be maximally inclusive of
which platforms they build for) can have a fully licensed
implementation of H.264 at no cost.
I expect that the actual licensing terms
* Michael Catanzaro:
On Sat, 2013-11-02 at 20:45 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
I expect that the actual licensing terms will only cover end users for
their own personal, non-commercial use (the language used in the end
user licensing terms for existing platform codecs in Windows and
Flash
functions with a special
prologue to support this:
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc782258%28v=ws.10%29.aspx
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code
.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
interoperability
whatsoever. Shouldn't this be a top priority for bundled applications?
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org
just a very difficult problem, no matter
how you eventually ship your bits.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
* drago:
Well you make it sound like that had any effect on the outcome but the slides
say that Fedora and Debian simply do not matter.
Debian would not have a practical problem with a H.264 requirement, so
I'm not sure if it matters in this context.
--
devel mailing list
components are involved.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
and st.type == directory then
os.execute(rm -rf %{_datadir}/applications/%{name}.desktop)
end
Wow. Shouldn't RPM support this out of the box?
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
argument
does not have to be parsed for format strings.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
this one.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
libraries goal?
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
*this* RPATH would not work if
it actually needed any of the JVM libraries.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
directly by applications)
3. OpenSSL
4. libgcrypt
I hope that both OpenJDK crypto providers are acceptable as well (one is
a wrapper around NSS, the other one is a separate implementation, mostly
in Java).
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel
());
The original version relied on the operator char *() overload of
QByteArray, but that isn't applied in a vararg context.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http
diagnostic. GCC could perhaps do better
in some cases, but not without relying on the optimizers.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http
), it does not make
much of a difference how the data is obtained about future build
failures. Filing bugs seems reasonable for tracking purposes.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman
On 12/06/2013 12:59 PM, Dhiru Kholia wrote:
Can you *really* pass a QByteArray object directly to printf (and similar
functions)?
Yes, as the format string argument, because the user-defined conversion
comparison operator to const char * kicks in.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product
On 12/06/2013 01:26 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:
On 12/06/2013 12:59 PM, Dhiru Kholia wrote:
Can you *really* pass a QByteArray object directly to printf (and similar
functions)?
Yes, as the format string argument, because the user-defined conversion
comparison operator to const char * kicks
of a solution?
For Boost, building packages on all the Fedora releases you want to
support should work because Boost usually offers source-based backwards
compatibility.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https
allowed to install packages.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
. It's not what GCC happens to
implement today anymore.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
Fedora Code of Conduct: http://fedoraproject.org/code-of-conduct
://www.freedesktop.org/software/polkit/docs/latest/polkit.8.html
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
On 02/05/2013 07:43 PM, Sérgio Basto wrote:
Any advises or opinions ?
I think you haven't yet described the original problem you're trying to
solve.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman
.
(This assumes that we own the certificate in question. Obviously, it
won't do to download the certificate from the Internet, bake it in, and
hope that it won't change until it expires. That's just not going to work.)
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel
On 02/08/2013 12:58 PM, Reindl Harald wrote:
Am 08.02.2013 12:54, schrieb Florian Weimer:
On 02/08/2013 12:41 PM, Michael Scherer wrote:
For a certificate, that's slightly more subtle. A certificate alone in a
package cannot do much. If there is no private key, then it cannot be
used out
a real use case
here, after all (avoid an unnecessary reboot).
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
release if it still
relevant there. You don't have to subscribe to any mailing list for
that, just being the reporter or Cc: on the bug is sufficient.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman
and off_t in public header files because of that
_FILE_OFFSET_BITS dependency. At least in such header files, using
explicit 64-bit types (uint64_t, presumably) is the way to go.
Admittedly, this has a certain yuck factor, but I don't see a way around
that.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product
. At least it results in a compile error and not
corruption at run time, but it's still far from ideal.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
| __fxstat
/usr/bin/locale| __xstat
/usr/bin/localedef | __fxstat
/usr/bin/localedef | __lxstat
/usr/bin/localedef | __xstat
/usr/bin/rpcgen| __xstat
/usr/bin/sprof | __fxstat
(9 rows)
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel
name), or does this affect CUPS? Will CUPS be extended to allow
downloading the Ghostscript source code?
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
stat bumps the inode nr past 2^32
(line numbers work on F18/kernel 3.7-8-ish at least)
Do you have something similar for readdir? Do you know what the kernel
does in this case?
It would be quite annoying if the result was a truncated or incomplete
directory listing.
--
Florian Weimer / Red
.
I think a similar optimization would be possible for access to global
variables because ld could compute the final layout of all global
variables in the binary itself, just as in the non-PIE case.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel
are
referenced from position-dependent code?
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
to rewrite working system components in C only to
reduce memory usage. This is what happened (or is expected to happen)
to some daemons written in Python.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman
.
(*) As soon as cryptography is involved, mathematically rigorous results
are the exception.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
On 04/18/2013 04:32 PM, Petr Pisar wrote:
On 2013-04-17, Florian Weimer fwei...@redhat.com wrote:
Ugh, hit Send too soon.
I found some packages which embed copies of the Porter stemmer library
(PostgreSQL, tracker, pl, etc.). Should I file bugs once I have the
full list, or should I apply
. It's not entirely trivial because we'd need overrides
(or ways to inject key material) for additional repositories added with
Kickstart.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
backporting both patches.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
driver signatures are alike because they do not
embed a cleartext developer name. (Not that UEFI firmware has
Authenticode prompts which show the certificate on the driver.)
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https
. Just like strcpy, and we all know how well that worked in practice.
That being said, my recent experience *writing* C++03 code has been
rather positive.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman
On 04/17/2013 02:48 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:
I found some packages which embed copies of the Porter stemmer library
(PostgreSQL, tracker, pl, etc.). Should I file bugs once I have the
full list, or should I apply for a bundling exception?
FYI, I'm deferring dealing with this until I've got
On 04/18/2013 01:08 AM, Björn Persson wrote:
Florian Weimer wrote:
Yes, Ada has some nice features. At least there are real arrays, but
they are somewhat cumbersome to work with, compared to Java, Python or,
well, C pointers. There are two aspects: preservation of array bounds
in slices (so
provides.
Most of the shared libraries in /lib{,64} *do* have a non-zero .e_entry.
( readelf -h *.so | grep 'Entry point' )
It seems all PIE executables are actually ET_DYN objects with an entry
point.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel
-
wise (only pulls in glib2)
... which Qt depends on for its event loop anyway.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
On 05/17/2013 07:17 AM, Ben Boeckel wrote:
While we're dredging up old threads ;) .
On Fri, 10 May, 2013 at 12:29:16 GMT, Florian Weimer wrote:
There is some fairly horrible stuff, like std::copy:
http://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/algorithm/copy
You can pass a std::vectorT::iterator (say
the %prep stage.
Unpacking SRPMs seems to be fairly common operation. Has something like
this already been implemented?
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
On 05/17/2013 09:36 PM, Adam Williamson wrote:
On Fri, 2013-05-17 at 16:37 +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
I'd like some scriptable way to unpack SRPMs up and including to the
%prep stage. Ideally, the results would end up in a directory I
specify, and intermediate directories which only contain
On 05/21/2013 02:08 PM, Simone Caronni wrote:
If there's a way to check if Secure Boot is enabled that would be great.
Why do you want to do that? That's almost always wrong, just like
checking for the AD bit in DNS responses.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel
On 05/21/2013 08:48 PM, Simone Caronni wrote:
Hello,
On 21 May 2013 17:43, Florian Weimer fwei...@redhat.com
mailto:fwei...@redhat.com wrote:
On 05/21/2013 02:08 PM, Simone Caronni wrote:
If there's a way to check if Secure Boot is enabled that would
be great.
Why do
On 05/17/2013 04:46 PM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
On Fri, May 17, 2013 at 04:37:13PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
I'd like some scriptable way to unpack SRPMs up and including to the
%prep stage. Ideally, the results would end up in a directory I
specify, and intermediate directories which
indexing. And right now,
accessing the actual source code is computationally expensive.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
functions at
run time and don't have to ship separate DSOs anymore.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
guarantee you can fix critical bugs for all users
who are potentially affected by them.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
--
devel mailing list
devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
https://admin.fedoraproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
1 - 100 of 1812 matches
Mail list logo
