Re: F37 Change Proposal: Unfiltered Flathub (System-Wide Change)

2022-07-06 Thread Glen Turner
I don't believe the technical details are as significant as the
systemtic change to the boundaries of trusted software maintainers.

Consider this comment, which appears to be the core justification:

Michael Catanzaro wrote:
> 
> Flatpaks already take precedence over RPMs, and there are no plans to
> change this for the reasons I mentioned in my previous mail regarding
> sandboxing, which is more important than other considerations.

A sandboxed trojan application is still capable of damaging the user's
security, even if it can't damage the system's security.

To illustrate the difference, a subverted browser can share all credit
card details seen (user's security compromised), but removing that
software removes the subversion (system security not compromised)

A preference order of

  Fedora Flatpak > GNOME Flatpak > Fedora RPM

makes user's security of graphical applications reliant upon a wider
set of trusted software maintainers than

  Fedora Flatpak > Fedora RPM > GNOME Flatpak

Essentially, for graphical applications the change makes Fedora trust
and security processes approach the minimum of of Fedora trust and
security processes and GNOME trust and security processes. That's 
change to the security stance of the distribution which requires
explicit discussion prior to accepting the change.

-glen
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Re: RFC: Change the default hostname for Fedora 26+

2016-11-11 Thread Glen Turner

> RFC 2606[1]  reserves several TLDs that may never be registered for
> public usage. Out of those, going with
> Fedora-.localhost
> seems like the best bet.

The *reason* localhost is a reserved name is to discourage its use in
DNS names.  Your proposal is the opposite to that intended by RFC2606,
something which the casual reader of your message may have missed.

-glen
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Re: nss_myhostname as default in Fedora

2016-02-08 Thread Glen Turner
> It's part of what nss-myhostname provides.  There's clearly no
> consensus on the "gateway" feature.

The belief of operating systems' programmers that a lack of a default 
gateway must imply no network connectivity constricts useful network 
designs.

My objection to the "gateway" name is simply that "ping gateway" gives 
applications another way to test this incorrect belief.

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Re: F21 Self Contained Change: Remote Journal Logging

2014-05-05 Thread Glen Turner

 I am pretty sure HTTP(s) is the right choice

Hi Lennart,

The choice of HTTPS does complicate the network infrastructure moving log 
records into a network management QoS class (ie, making sure that remote 
logging works during a DoS attack caused by malware).

If you feel that HTTPS is the correct protocol then please consider using 
another port number than 443.

Cheers, glen

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Re: F20 System Wide Change: No Default Syslog

2013-07-19 Thread Glen Turner
Hi Lennart,

I suppose someone should mention small flash-disk-only computers.

There traditionally we fling syslog messages to the serial console or a LRU 
buffer in RAM (often the dmesg buffer). The point is to avoid I/O on the flash 
memory. Syslog daemons tend to do a lot of fsync-ed I/O, which just chews up 
flash write cycles. With some configuration the syslog daemons can be made to 
not to fsync, and with additional configuration to write to the serial port or 
to the dmesg ring buffer.

These small computers aren't specialised embedded systems anymore -- if you buy 
a cheap ARM-based laptop then you are buying a such a system. Their increasing 
popularity is very much the reason ARM is becoming a top-teir architecture in 
Fedora. These systems are *cheap*, so they don't have the write cycles of an 
expensive SSD.

I'm not across journald at all. But the questions in my mind are:

- Is is possible to run journald without writing to disk; that is: to serial as 
text, or as binary to a ring buffer which can then by used by journalctl?

- When writing to disk does journald fsync, and if so can that be disabled by a 
non-guru laptop user?

- Is journalctl available from the dracut shell, so that we can get bug reports 
for early system failures? There is a lot more variation in small computers, 
and thus more early system failures.

Thank you for making the binary format portable between computers. Allowing a 
32b ARM journal file to be displayed on a x86_64 desktop is very useful.

Thank you for your time, glen
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Re: Minimal install diff from F16 to F19 (TC6)

2013-06-24 Thread Glen Turner

On 24/06/2013, at 9:00 PM, Chris Adams wrote:

 Once upon a time, Glen Turner said:
 What we don't want is a scenario where configuring these protocols on 
 servers has to be done by network engineers. We want them configured from a 
 GUI and supervised by a master daemon. Let's call that NetworkManager.
 
 You think hundreds of servers (with untold numbers of VMs), or any
 complicated networking setups, are going to each have their network
 configuration managed by a GUI?

In that case I think the sysadmin will do what they do now. Run the GUI on 
their development box, look at the underlying NetworkManager configuration 
files it created, generalise them, and then farm them out using puppet.

What I am arguing against is the current situation where a server administrator 
has to configure each element of a network configuration, in one configuration 
file per protocol. It's bad enough as it is now, without data centre networking 
exploding the number of protocols seen by a VM host. The router experience has 
been that per-protocol configuration is a dead end. The lesson appears to be 
that it is better to deploy software which directly addresses use-cases (thus 
explaining some of the hype around OpenFlow). I see NetworkManager as the best 
tool to do that job on Linux.

To deploy a new network service you deploy the NetworkManager plugin, its 
dependencies, and a lightweight configuration file written by the NM GUI. I'd 
hope for a plugin ecosystem, since the number of use cases, and the variations 
on those, is pretty large.

With a use-case approach rather than a protocol configuration approach junior 
sysadmins don't also need to be network engineers in order to deploy networking 
features -- ranging from a protocol nightmare like MPLS-based data centre 
networking; to anycast networking for DNS; to IPVS and HA failover. This sort 
of mechanism also gives the opportunity to promote good practices which aren't 
done because they are too hard: such as placing management traffic in a 
preferenced tc class which will allow device management connectivity during a 
DoS, or running LLDP on physical interfaces to allow simple discovery of 
cabling mistakes; from the sysadmins point of view they just enable those 
plugins. Note that these are runtime plugins -- not configuration-time 
wizards -- if you have multiple plugins requiring the services of the BGP 
protocol then they should both succeed.

-glen

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Re: Minimal install diff from F16 to F19 (TC6)

2013-06-23 Thread Glen Turner

On 21/06/2013, at 4:28 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
 
 It's supported that for 4 or 5 years.  You don't need aliases at all,

Consider an anycast service where the alias interface reflects the availability 
of the service on the server. An OSPF or BGP daemon then advertises the address 
of the alias interface into the network.

You want to be able to up/down the alias interface independently of the other 
addressing on the physical interface. You don't want to remove the addressing 
-- from a the routing daemon's point of view there's a considerable difference 
between no addressing (an error) and down (a state).

And sure, this isn't a common desktop scenario. But as NetworkManager makes its 
way into servers...

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Re: Minimal install diff from F16 to F19 (TC6)

2013-06-23 Thread Glen Turner

On 21/06/2013, at 10:31 PM, Chris Adams wrote:
 
 Current network information is available from the kernel and doesn't
 require guessing.  Why would you code something to talk to some random
 daemon API (that may change) when you could talk directly to the source
 via the kernel netlink API?

The classic here being applications which look for NM messages to indicate that 
networking connectivity is available rather than waiting on the presence of 
non-directly connected routes in the routing table.

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Re: Minimal install diff from F16 to F19 (TC6)

2013-06-23 Thread Glen Turner

On 22/06/2013, at 7:23 PM, Richard W.M. Jones wrote:
 
 (2) Write a shell script that contains the ifconfig/route add (or ip ...)
 commands they need and have it run at boot.  Most simple static
 network configs are 2 or 3 commands at most.

If you have a server in the tradition of UNIX workstations sure. But such 
simple networking isn't the case for some servers today, and it's hard to see 
that it will be the case in the future.

Sun's tagline of the network is the computer was true. But for servers these 
days the computer is the network is also the case. It's nothing for a server 
today to statically NAT or bridge IPv4 to VMs. Even in that case it's best if 
the guest VM picks up its IPv4 addressing using DHCP.

But in the future we'll want to do better than that: to move network routing 
onto the server itself. These new data centre ethernet protocols are not 
entirely implemented in kernel space. Some run quite complex BGP and MPLS 
control planes; others run IS-IS control planes.

The ethernet link itself isn't remaining a simple thing either. Once you're 
running a few hundred servers then management protocols start to pay their way: 
LLDP (what server is on this switch port?), ethernet OAM (help, the cable is 
running errors).

What we don't want is a scenario where configuring these protocols on servers 
has to be done by network engineers. We want them configured from a GUI and 
supervised by a master daemon. Let's call that NetworkManager.

Now maybe Dan hasn't quite realised what he's signed up for here. But then 
again, there was a time when I despaired of Linux ever working with a 3G modem, 
whereas today it offers the best experience of all the operating systems.

-glen

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Re: Call for Bikeshedding: remote auth at install time

2013-06-08 Thread Glen Turner
Kickstart is fine for centrally managed devices. They've got experienced
sysadmins who don't mind getting dirty with configuration files.

The real kicker is people who manage their own device: not just BYOD
but also part-time sysadmins who can't run the corporate distribution.
These people can suck substantial time from deep support at the help desk.

For those people there does needs to be an easy way for them to configure
a network authenticating account. But there's no need for that to be
in the installation dialogues. Considering that IT support might approach
them well after installation and say our policy is that machine
authenticate against the Corporate Blah rather than have local
authentication there's a strong argument for being able to do this well
away from installation.

I'd also strongly encourage a design which makes it easy for a
corporate-issued RPM to configure the authentication. For an example of
something wonderful, NetworkManager has a one-file-per-ssid design so its
easy for a RPM to drop in the configuration files for the corporate wireless.
I'd really like a company to be able to have a set of noarch RPMS which put
in place the minimum configuration for use within the organisation.

-glen
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Re: [announce] yum: parallel downloading

2012-05-21 Thread Glen Turner

On 21/05/2012, at 5:12 PM, Zdenek Pavlas wrote:
 
 Three connections limit is used when the above is not available
 (e.g. a baseurl setup with just one mirror).  I don't mind lowering
 it to just two, as that should work good enough in most cases.

Yes please. Two is better than three from the server's point of view.

Yum doesn't put in the HTTP header (say, appended to User-Agent) why it decided 
to use our mirror, so we have no count of the sites or users which manually set 
baseurl or give our mirror's name to anaconda. Mailing list postings often 
recommend this when people complain of slow or expensive downloads.

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Re: [announce] yum: parallel downloading

2012-05-19 Thread Glen Turner
On 19/05/12 01:04, José Matos wrote:

 The total number of connections should be the same, as far as I
 understand only the number of connections from a single host will be three.

The risk is the rise in the maximum number of concurrent connections. A
server happily supplying 50,000 concurrent connections should not be
assumed to remain happy at 150,000 concurrent connections.

 Since it should be safe to assume that the downloads are independent
 events then there should not be any significant difference for busy
 servers. :-)

I am afraid that I have missed your point here. I am somewhat blinded by
the use of the word independent. I have a statistical background and
that word carries a meaning similar to unrelated.

Perhaps you could state your argument with more explanation

Thank you, Glen

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Re: [announce] yum: parallel downloading

2012-05-18 Thread Glen Turner
On 17/05/12 01:37, Zdenek Pavlas wrote:
 - mirror limits are honored, too.
 
 Making many connections to the same mirror usually does not help much, it just
 consumes more resources.  That's why Yum also uses mirror limits from
 metalink.xml.  If no such limit is available, at most 3 simultaneous
 connections are made to any single mirror.

Hi Zdenek,

Why is the default three connections rather than one? Is a tripling of
the number of connections to a mirror on a Fedora release day desirable?
Consider that a large mirror site already sees concurrent connections in
the multiple 10,000s.

Cheers, Glen
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Re: GNS 3 http://www.gns3.net

2012-05-14 Thread Glen Turner
On 15/05/12 07:21, Colin Stubbs wrote:

 These are what I've fiddled with/created and am currently using for 
 FC16/x86_64,
...
 http://www.routedlogic.net/files/dynamips.spec

You might want to add the patch for multiple idlepc values. This makes a
big difference in practice.

As far as Fedora's policy Packages which are not useful without
external bits note that there are repositories such as rpmfusion with
less strict inclusion criteria. Perhaps your package would be happier
there, whilst still making it easy for Fedora users to install GNS3.

Note that Cisco is not the world's only networking vendor and some other
vendors make their software available as a VM image for evaluation and
learning. You might add the ready availability of learning platforms to
the Request for Tender the next time you make a major networking purchase.

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Re: default media size [Was: Proposed F18 feature: MiniDebugInfo]

2012-05-12 Thread Glen Turner
On 11/05/12 00:30, Adam Jackson wrote:
 So the set of people we'd be inconveniencing is exactly the set of
 people with no bandwidth and the inability to boot from anything larger
 than a CD.

The way forward for those cheap machines on cheap networks is to let
them boot from CD but to then pull most of the installation from USB
hard disk or flash.

I believe that this amounts to little more than a better description in
the documentation.

As for your question about numbers, the high end  machines coming
through my local PCs for the poor refurbisher (www.aspitech.com.au)
have DVD-ROM drives (ie, even those more expensive machines can't write
a DVD image, but can write a CD image). So this isn't only a third-world
issue, but one faced by anyone trying to get Linux running whilst on low
income.

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Re: urandom vs haveged

2012-04-01 Thread Glen Turner
The risk is reading unused blocks using the drive's hardware. Those
unused blocks may contain user data, operating system state, or a covert
channel allowing data or state to be inferred.

The response is to overwrite all of the disk with some value.

The random number generator is a higher risk means to provide that value
than writing a fixed value.

Firstly, it is difficult to test that the operation has succeeded.
Whereas the operation of writing a fixed value is simple to verify.

Secondly, the operation of the random number generator itself is
difficult to test.

In general, non-cryptographers see random numbers as some sort of magic
sauce whereas cryptographers see random numbers as a lever to crack
open the machine state. Random numbers are invaluable for forcing
attackers to search an entire state. But where they are not needed they
should not be used, since if you don't provide a lever than an attacker
can't push against it. Keeping a large sample on permanent storage of
random numbers generated by that very machine is providing a very
large lever to push against any flaw.

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Re: DHCPv6 *still* broken for F17 alpha

2012-03-16 Thread Glen Turner
On 2012-03-15 Dan Williams wrote:
 The only effect this checking will have is to change NetworkManager's
 state from CONNECTED_GLOBAL to CONNECTED_SITE or CONNECTED_LOCAL.  It
 doesn't do anything odd like disconnect and retry some other
connection,
 which wouldn't make much sense.  It just changes some state which apps
 can use to figure out whether they'd connect to say your IRC server or
 your email or whatever automatically.

Hi Dan,

I suggest that is something the application should determine, not
NetworkManager.

Take the case where a ISP loses international connectivity, then a
NetworkManager-informed application won't connect to the in-country
ISP's IRC/e-mail/... server even though those servers are available.
Thus connectivity detection worsens a partial loss of connectivity into
a full loss of connectivity.

The app has to be able to handle no connectivity anyway: just because
Network Manager can HTTP GET the URI doesn't mean that IRC works. For
example, a corporate firewall could allow HTTP but block IRC.

Both the end-to-end argument and occam's razor argue for the application
gracefully handling no connectivity.

The current situation is that many apps don't handle a lack of
connectivity with grace. But I suggest that this isn't NetworkManager's
problem to solve.

Even the current situation isn't great. NetworkManager shouldn't be
telling applications that the network is available. That DBUS
message should be triggered by the insertion into the main forwarding
table of a default route. Then any source of global connectivity will
set the app connecting (NM, NM work alikes, ip route add, ospfd,
tunnels, etc).

Best wishes, Glen

PS: I really don't understand the operation of dnssec-triggerd. The
paths for HTTP and DNS traffic through an enterprise network can be very
different so testing one protocol doesn't say a huge amount about the
availability of the other protocol.  But then I don't even understand
the desirability of that program: allowing an external event (eg an
access list on a router or a DoS attack) to trigger a reconfiguration
from a DNSSEC-validating to a non-validating configuration seems more of
a security bug than a feature. But I'm likely missing something here.

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Re: Notice: IPv6 breaking issues tentatively considered blocker for F17

2012-03-13 Thread Glen Turner
Hi,

I am the network engineer at Australia's Academic and Research Network
responsible for assisting the deployment of IPv6 across Australian
universities. Your posting was bought to my attention.

Your phrasing of the condition for blocking is pretty broad: there are
lots of ways to break IPv6, just as there are with IPv4, and just as
with IPv4 not all of them are significant enough to be blocking.

Can I suggest the following as a starting point:
 - failure in configuration of interface addresses with a link scope
address via stateless address autoconfiguration should block
 - failure in configuration of interface addresses with a global scope
via stateless address autoconfiguration should block
 - failure in configuration of interface addresses with a global scope
via manual configuration should block
 - failure in configuration of DNS forwarding via stateless DHCP6 should
block
 - failure in configuration of DNS forwarding via RAs should block
 - failure of connectivity of network ::1/128 (localhost) of all
services should block
 - failure of unicast or multicast connectivity of link local addressing
of allowed services should block
 - failure of unicast connectivity of global addressing of allowed
services should block
 - failure of connectivity of ICMP6 service for codes = 127 should
block

Non-stateless DHCP6 is primarily used by ISPs to configure customer
routers. Those routers present SLAAC to their downstream users.

Non-stateless DHCP6 is also used by enterprises who wish to parallel
their existing management of computers via IPv4 DHCP into IPv6. In my
view that is a poor network design choice, but there is no denying that
it is a choice made by some enterprise networks.

At this point in time you could deploy a IPv6 with manual configuration
and with SLAAC (with both stateless DHCP6 and RAs to configure DNS) and
make most people happy. The significance of the proportion of people
made unhappy may or may not be enough for a release blocking bug (as
opposed to simple lack of support for that IPv6 feature) -- that's
really your choice.

It also depends if statefull DHCP6 host configuration was supported in a
previous release, in that case a regression leads to such a complicated
scenario for network engineers and systems administrators that the bug
should be release blocking.

Cheers,
Glen

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Re: Access rights for system logs

2011-02-28 Thread Glen Turner
On Sun, 2011-02-27 at 23:20 +0100, Till Maas wrote:
 On Sun, Feb 27, 2011 at 12:30:43PM -0700, Kevin Fenzi wrote:
 
  Were you thinking of just /var/log/messages? or all log files? 
  Or all syslog written files? or ?
  
  If you are talking all log files, I would suggest making this into a
  feature for f16, since it's going to require coordinating a bunch of
  changes of packages to have the right group ownership of their log
  files. 
 
 It is only required for log files that are not world-readable.
...

The existence of /var/log/secure suggests that the policy is not as
simple as one group owning all file files.

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