Re: Installing RPMS via Customization Key

2008-03-07 Thread C. Scott Ananian
On Fri, Mar 7, 2008 at 10:30 AM, Benjamin M. Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > | It is specifically design to allow countries (or schools) to create > | customied builds *without* requiring OLPC to sign or approve their > | changes. > > Right. I thought the solution was that each country w

Re: Installing RPMS via Customization Key

2008-03-07 Thread Benjamin M. Schwartz
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 C. Scott Ananian wrote: | On Fri, Mar 7, 2008 at 9:37 AM, Benjamin M. Schwartz | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: |> It is difficult to comment on this without more detail on "USB |> customization keys". My understanding was that such customization would

Re: Installing RPMS via Customization Key

2008-03-07 Thread C. Scott Ananian
On Fri, Mar 7, 2008 at 9:37 AM, Benjamin M. Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > It is difficult to comment on this without more detail on "USB > customization keys". My understanding was that such customization would > be done once at the level of whole countries, that it would be restricted

Re: Installing RPMS via Customization Key

2008-03-07 Thread Benjamin M. Schwartz
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Michael Stone wrote: | It's completely unsafe to use the new USB customization keys to execute | software located on-key or on-NAND because any opportunity for arbitrary code | execution as uid 0 represents a serious threat to our first-boot activation

Installing RPMS via Customization Key

2008-03-06 Thread Michael Stone
Friends, It's completely unsafe to use the new USB customization keys to execute software located on-key or on-NAND because any opportunity for arbitrary code execution as uid 0 represents a serious threat to our first-boot activation security. Since we appear to want to be able to customize imag