On Fri, May 30, 2008 at 1:15 AM, Edward Cherlin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 8:45 PM, Albert Cahalan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 5:07 PM, Edward Cherlin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 10:48 AM, Albert Cahalan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[+cc: Mako]
Selective quoting:
On Fri, May 30, 2008 at 7:15 AM, Edward Cherlin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You're on crack, Albert.
...
Albert, I'm not talking to you any more until you start making sense.
Not to pick on you personally Edward, this just triggered something:
I've long thought we
On Fri, May 30, 2008 at 11:04:57AM +0200, Morgan Collett wrote:
[+cc: Mako]
Selective quoting:
On Fri, May 30, 2008 at 7:15 AM, Edward Cherlin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You're on crack, Albert.
...
Albert, I'm not talking to you any more until you start making
sense.
As a side
On 29/05/08 23:45 -0400, Albert Cahalan wrote:
Also, I think you completely misunderstand the market. The ability to
use Open FirmWare instead of a proprietary BIOS will be of intense
interest to all PC vendors. I expect OFW to sweep through most of the
market in no more than two or three
Actually, the goals are more limited. Say you have dual-boot; OS 1 has
bitfrost, OS 2 does not. Things OS 2 should not do:
1. Read private files from OS 1.
1a. Read encryption key from OS 1, thus subverting all security which that
key gives. This, in particular, should be avoided.
1a(i). By
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 7:48 PM, Albert Cahalan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jameson Chema Quinn writes:
Actually, the goals are more limited. Say you have dual-boot;
OS 1 has bitfrost, OS 2 does not. Things OS 2 should not do:
1. Read private files from OS 1.
...
2. By writing to OS 1's file
I just had an IRC conversation with Benjamin Schwarz in which we talked
about:
He said that 3,4, and 5 have been considered more serious than 1 and 2;
since they are impossible, there is little point doing 1 and 2. I disagreed.
There is no way with current hardware to write-protect the NAND
On Thu, 29 May 2008, Jameson Chema Quinn wrote:
I just had an IRC conversation with Benjamin Schwarz in which we talked
about:
He said that 3,4, and 5 have been considered more serious than 1 and 2;
since they are impossible, there is little point doing 1 and 2. I disagreed.
There is no way
2008/5/29 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Thu, 29 May 2008, Jameson Chema Quinn wrote:
I just had an IRC conversation with Benjamin Schwarz in which we talked
about:
He said that 3,4, and 5 have been considered more serious than 1 and 2;
since they are impossible, there is little point doing 1 and
On Thu, 29 May 2008, Jameson Chema Quinn wrote:
2008/5/29 [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
On Thu, 29 May 2008, Jameson Chema Quinn wrote:
I just had an IRC conversation with Benjamin Schwarz in which we talked
about:
He said that 3,4, and 5 have been considered more serious than 1 and 2;
since they
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 10:48 AM, Albert Cahalan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jameson Chema Quinn writes:
Actually, the goals are more limited. Say you have dual-boot;
OS 1 has bitfrost, OS 2 does not. Things OS 2 should not do:
1. Read private files from OS 1.
...
2. By writing to OS 1's file
On Thu, 29 May 2008, Jameson Chema Quinn wrote:
if you run everything as user olpc and user olpc can become root without a
password, getting olpc is as good as getting root.
An arbitrary process running as user olpc should not be able to get root. My
impression is that it cannot,
Am Donnerstag 29 Mai 2008 23:07:23 schrieb Edward Cherlin:
The question was, how to protect Linux from Windows, in particular
from malware allowed in by Windows. (Or possibly from malware designed
into Windows, a marketing practice not unknown in the past.)
Protecting Windows-only machines is
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 02:58:07PM -0600, Jameson Chema Quinn wrote:
if you run everything as user olpc and user olpc can become root without a
password, getting olpc is as good as getting root.
An arbitrary process running as user olpc should not be able to get root. My
impression is that
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 11:25:05PM +0200, Arne Babenhauserheide wrote:
Am Donnerstag 29 Mai 2008 23:07:23 schrieb Edward Cherlin:
The question was, how to protect Linux from Windows, in particular
Why protect GNU/Linux from Windows?
If people install Windows on their XOs, then it's their
Am Donnerstag 29 Mai 2008 23:58:04 schrieben Sie:
Yes, you did (where have you been hiding =) ). Windows will come
preinstalled on XO's at the client's request. And in developing countries
the paying clients (ministries of eductaion, etc.) receive technical advice
and counsel mostly from
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 2:25 PM, Arne Babenhauserheide [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Am Donnerstag 29 Mai 2008 23:07:23 schrieb Edward Cherlin:
The question was, how to protect Linux from Windows, in particular
from malware allowed in by Windows. (Or possibly from malware designed
into Windows, a
Am Freitag 30 Mai 2008 01:44:29 schrieb Edward Cherlin:
I don't often write here, but at the moment I don't see why BitFrost
should be used in the first case (except, because we _can_).
Because of governments that will not buy unprotected laptops for
schoolchildren.
But they buy them with
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 5:05 PM, Arne Babenhauserheide [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Am Freitag 30 Mai 2008 01:44:29 schrieb Edward Cherlin:
I don't often write here, but at the moment I don't see why BitFrost
should be used in the first case (except, because we _can_).
Because of governments
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 5:07 PM, Edward Cherlin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, May 29, 2008 at 10:48 AM, Albert Cahalan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I do believe that, practically speaking, all of this is moot.
Windows uses both SD card storage and the NAND flash storage.
(NAND storage being
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What are you trying to prevent?
- --Ben
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On May 28, 2008, at 8:33 PM, Benjamin M. Schwartz wrote:
What are you trying to prevent?
He doesn't want one OS to be able to screw with files from another in
a dual-boot scenario. I don't think it's a good extension of the
threat model.
--
Ivan Krstić [EMAIL PROTECTED] | http://radian.org
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