Re: [Discuss] Why the dislike of X.509?

2014-08-29 Thread Derek Atkins
Richard, Richard Pieri richard.pi...@gmail.com writes: On 8/28/2014 1:40 PM, Derek Atkins wrote: Passwords? We don't need no stinking passwords! You don't need to know your user's passwords, you have access to their keys! If I could dump a copy of your KDC database then I could then

Re: [Discuss] vnc

2014-08-29 Thread Dan Ritter
On Thu, Aug 28, 2014 at 11:12:09PM +, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote: From: Dan Ritter [mailto:d...@randomstring.org] Sent: Thursday, August 28, 2014 6:59 PM Suppose we play the game, and I think of a phrase, and you say the magic word is squeamish ossifrage, and purely by chance,

Re: [Discuss] Why the dislike of X.509?

2014-08-29 Thread Matthew Gillen
On 8/29/2014 7:12 AM, Derek Atkins wrote: A bad actor can do *everything* with a compromised KDC. Yes, there are steps to prevent compromise, just like there are steps to prevent compromise of an X.509 CA. The main difference here is that if I Except there aren't. X.509 lacks mechanisms to

Re: [Discuss] Wireless devices, 2 Wireless Routers, local network. DD-WRT

2014-08-29 Thread Richard Pieri
On 8/29/2014 12:33 AM, Bill Bogstad wrote: camp -- wireless -- G router -- wired -- N router -- wireless - local clients This is preferable. camp -- wireless -- G router -- wireless -- N router -- wireless - local clients This is what I suggested, using the Repeater Bridge, if wired between

Re: [Discuss] Why the dislike of X.509?

2014-08-29 Thread Richard Pieri
On 8/29/2014 7:12 AM, Derek Atkins wrote: So let me rephrase, because you're right a dump of the kdc database is still encrypted in the master key. But if I can get a clone of the KDC disk then I've got *everything*, not just able to impersonate but as I stated before also able to read most

Re: [Discuss] Why the dislike of X.509?

2014-08-29 Thread Richard Pieri
On 8/29/2014 8:23 AM, Matthew Gillen wrote: My understanding (and it's possible I made this up, I can't seem to find any supporting documentation with a cursory search of the intertubes) is that the main approach to dealing with CA compromises is to use chaining: you have the root CA(s) locked

Re: [Discuss] vnc

2014-08-29 Thread Edward Ned Harvey (blu)
I know this is beating a dead horse, and also OT for the vnc topic. Suppose you pick a word randomly from a word list, suppose it's the GSL, and the word selection is worth approx 11 bits of entropy. If that word happens to be a then you have 11 bits per character. If the word happens to be

Re: [Discuss] vnc = passphrase entropy

2014-08-29 Thread Bill Ricker
[changing subject line in case this continues further] On Fri, Aug 29, 2014 at 11:14 AM, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) b...@nedharvey.com wrote: This would mean that each word in a sentence is 0.67 times as random as a perfectly random word. I don't buy it. I swear that measurement is grossly

Re: [Discuss] vnc = passphrase entropy

2014-08-29 Thread Richard Pieri
I have a better solution: use a FIPS 181 password generator to generate a phrase of nonsense, stuff that into your encrypted keychain, and be done with it. -- Rich P. ___ Discuss mailing list Discuss@blu.org

Re: [Discuss] vnc = passphrase entropy

2014-08-29 Thread Bill Ricker
On Fri, Aug 29, 2014 at 1:32 PM, Richard Pieri richard.pi...@gmail.com wrote: I have a better solution: use a FIPS 181 password generator to generate a phrase of nonsense, stuff that into your encrypted keychain, and be done with it. That's fine for JFDI. Assuming FIPS-181 'words' are mnemonic

Re: [Discuss] vnc = passphrase entropy

2014-08-29 Thread Richard Pieri
On 8/29/2014 7:22 PM, Bill Ricker wrote: That's fine for JFDI. Assuming FIPS-181 'words' are mnemonic enough for you. It's not me. It's my keychains. The only passwords or phrases that I need to remember are the ones to unlock my keychains. I stuff pretty much anything that I want into a