Richard Pieri richard.pi...@gmail.com writes:
Really. The code works exactly as it was designed to work. Therefore
technically not a bug. What's broken about it is the stupid design
decision that led to it being written. So I call it a stupid.
That's not quite right. Reading beyond the ends of
Mike Small wrote:
heartbeat requirement at all for the TCP case, but it's always a bug to
take external untrusted data at its word in this way.
I maintain that this isn't a bug; it's willful stupidity.
Perhaps. There may be an economic argument why Open Source, or some
parts of it, isn't
Mike Small queried:
There may be an economic argument why Open Source, or some
parts of it, isn't getting enough attention from enough of the right
people. I don't know.
In the past, I used to look at source code a lot more than I do these days.
My main reason was that the stock distros
Mike Small wrote:
Btw. if having source code adds no value for verification, why do the
FIPS CMVP procedures ask for it for the Design Assurance part of their
review?
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/CMVPFAQ.pdf
I'm surprised that nobody has chimed in on this one, yet, since
On April 24, 2014 at 10:34 AM Richard Pieri richard.pi...@gmail.com wrote:
Mike Small wrote:
heartbeat requirement at all for the TCP case, but it's always a bug to
take external untrusted data at its word in this way.
I maintain that this isn't a bug; it's willful stupidity.
The reason a
On 04/22/2014 07:40 AM, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
Nobody rolls his own crypto algorithm. And I mean nobody.
Everybody, and I mean everybody, uses a standard library implementation of an
open standard.
Not entirely true. One of my contracts had a major telephony client, and
a colleague
From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Jerry Feldman
that nearly any primate could break it. We could have used DES because
we did use DES for part of the project. But, anyone who knows what they
are doing certainly
Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
How many years ago did you see the lower life form rolling his/her
own crypto like an idiot? I will actually be shocked if it's anytime
within the last decade. Unless it was just an archaic system put in
place over a decade ago and still in operation today.
I
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 08:14:15PM -0400, Richard Pieri wrote:
The knife cuts both ways, Tom. If white hats can use tools like
these to find flaws in code then black hats can use the same tools
to find the same flaws. Closed source crypto becomes more beneficial
to the world than open source
Derek Martin wrote:
Unless they hack the vendor and steal the source. White hats aren't
going to do that. Or... unless the NSA or some other organization has
paid off the vendor to intentionally include weaknesses for them to
exploit. Or... unless the attacker works for the vendor and is
On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 12:04:22PM -0400, Richard Pieri wrote:
Derek Martin wrote:
Unless they hack the vendor and steal the source. White hats aren't
going to do that. [...]
What's your point? That hiding the code is of zero relevance to the
security of that code?
The point was perfectly
Derek Martin wrote:
Attackers have many other means to effect attacks if they are
motivated...and they are. Closed source only hinders those who are
unwilling to commit crimes and/or who lack the resources to achieve
their goals. Black hats are not bound by the former, and there are
plenty of
Edward Ned Harvey (blu) b...@nedharvey.com writes:
From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Derek Martin
Or... unless the NSA or some other organization has
paid off the vendor to intentionally include weaknesses for
On 04/23/2014 10:37 AM, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Jerry Feldman
that nearly any primate could break it. We could have used DES because
we did use DES for part of the
Richard Pieri richard.pi...@gmail.com writes:
The world doesn't trust OpenSSL because it's open source. The world
trusts OpenSSL because the cryptographic module has a FIPS 140-2
certificate. That certificate happens to be the same level certificate
that Microsoft has for their cryptographic
Mike Small wrote:
Which part of the world using OpenSSL actually passes 1 as ONOFF to
FIPS_mode_set?
At a minimum that would be everyone communicating with or within US
government agencies using OpenSSL under SBU requirements.
I would have thought the world doesn't trust OpenSSL much at
Richard Pieri richard.pi...@gmail.com writes:
I would have thought the world doesn't trust OpenSSL much at all at this
exact moment, though perhaps it trusts that one module, maybe, well
except the openbsd people not so much:
Yes, well, the Heartbleed stupid isn't in the certified module and
Mike Small wrote:
So this is kind of what troubles me in the line this thread has taken
re. checking that the encryption algorithms are well chosen and
implemented correctly.
That's why the world trusts the cryptographic module in OpenSSL: it's
been examined and confirmed to be implemented
Richard Pieri richard.pi...@gmail.com writes:
Mike Small wrote:
So this is kind of what troubles me in the line this thread has taken
re. checking that the encryption algorithms are well chosen and
implemented correctly.
That's why the world trusts the cryptographic module in OpenSSL: it's
From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Tom Metro
Being open source [...]. It's
is merely a necessary precondition for determining that crypto is
trustworthy.
Sorry, but this statement is simply false.
Tell me the
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 11:40:58AM +, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Tom Metro
Being open source [...]. It's
is merely a necessary precondition for determining that
From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Derek Martin
Anything involving security or encryption is rarely simply anything.
Point?
Hogwash. The difference is interested, qualified parties can't
inspect the
From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Derek Martin
The first AES competition lasted 5 years, up to 2001. During that time,
several openly published ciphers were compared and scrutinized openly, and made
available to
From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org [mailto:discuss-
bounces+blu=nedharvey@blu.org] On Behalf Of Derek Martin
If you can't inspect it, you can't trust it. Period.
Supposing a bad guy writes software, open source, and makes it available for
download in source form as well as
On 4/22/14, 14:37 , Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
You're saying, that the only way anybody in the world can trust anything, is
to literally download everything from source, *read* all the source, and
compile it themselves.
instead of just calling bs can you suggest some other means by which
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 06:37:51PM +, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
Supposing a bad guy writes software, open source, and makes it
available for download in source form as well as precompiled binary,
where he's compiled some trojan into the binary.
Yes, this can happen. And only if the
From: Derek Martin [mailto:inva...@pizzashack.org]
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 06:37:51PM +, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
Supposing a bad guy writes software, open source, and makes it
available for download in source form as well as precompiled binary,
where he's compiled some trojan
john saylor js0...@gmail.com writes:
On 4/22/14, 14:37 , Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
You're saying, that the only way anybody in the world can trust
anything, is to literally download everything from source, *read*
all the source, and compile it themselves.
instead of just calling bs can
Richard Pieri wrote:
Google's methodology has not to my knowledge been publicized.
Correct.
Tom Metro wrote:
Source code analysis has the potential to find these, if the code is
analyzed. Back-box testing will find them only if you are very lucky.
This is laughably false. If it were even
Tom Metro wrote:
Anyone who read this thread will recall that my comments were in the
context of a certain class of errors.
Here's what you wrote:
That's a simplistic understanding of how crypto algorithms work. An
algorithm might consist of multiple layered state machines, and
triggering a
Richard Pieri wrote:
Mike Small wrote:
No static analysis tools, no runtime memory debuggers, no discussing
the problem and the general code quality in public forums...
None of these told us about the Heartbleed flaw in OpenSSL. As a matter
of fact, it was Codenomicon attacking their own
Anyone following the AeroFS thread knows I just wrote a bunch about good and
bad crypto, with particular emphasis that the quality of crypto is not strongly
correlated to the code being open or closed source.
Speaking of which, this is something I put some work into recently, that I'm
proud of
Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
Anyone following the AeroFS thread knows I just wrote a bunch about
good and bad crypto, with particular emphasis that the quality of
crypto is not strongly correlated to the code being open or closed
source.
Indeed. The Heartbleed fiasco is a perfect example of
33 matches
Mail list logo
