Re: [pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-20 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Wed, Jun 20, 2007 at 01:50:10PM -0400, Chris Buechler wrote: > Any switch's CAM table can be overflowed by directly connected users, > but good switches won't fully turn into a hub in that scenario. Good > switches keep one CAM table per VLAN, and in the case of overflow, only > the overflow

Re: [pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-20 Thread Chris Buechler
Bill Marquette wrote: Low end switches have a tendency to not have enough ram or cpu to handle a high volume mac spoofing attack and will usually end up turning into a hub under this kind of attack, rendering your vlans useless. Any switch's CAM table can be overflowed by directly connected us

RE: [pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-19 Thread Greg Hennessy
> Ahh, see there's your first problem. You trust your users :) I don't > even trust myself, I'm certainly not about to trust my users :) At > any rate, sounds like you don't have a solid need for the physical > separation, it's best practice, but not always the right answer to the > problem at

Re: [pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-19 Thread Bill Marquette
On 6/19/07, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 01:47:22PM -0500, Bill Marquette wrote: > Low end switches have a tendency to not have enough ram or cpu to > handle a high volume mac spoofing attack and will usually end up If the switches are behind the pfsense firewa

Re: [pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-19 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 01:47:22PM -0500, Bill Marquette wrote: > Low end switches have a tendency to not have enough ram or cpu to > handle a high volume mac spoofing attack and will usually end up If the switches are behind the pfsense firewall, and the users are trusted, will this still happen

Re: [pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-19 Thread Bill Marquette
On 6/19/07, Greg Hennessy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Mixing different trust levels on the same switch is rather frowned > upon. > > Because of potential vulnerabilities in the switch OS, allowing an > attacker to reassign VLANs? Yes. The switch may be in a locked cabinet/cage, but never say

RE: [pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-19 Thread Greg Hennessy
> > Who do you propose to bribe @ RIPE to get a /24 ? Can you pass me > their > > details via pm :-) > > Well, it's just 256 addresses, which is not excessive. I remember those days :-). It was 1994 (cue the flashback LOL). > I have a /24 > myself (thinly populated so far, but vservers can

Re: [pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-19 Thread Eugen Leitl
On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 10:40:12AM +0100, Greg Hennessy wrote: > > > > Quick question, assuming I can get a /24 public network, > > Who do you propose to bribe @ RIPE to get a /24 ? Can you pass me their > details via pm :-) Well, it's just 256 addresses, which is not excessive. I have a /24 my

RE: [pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-19 Thread Greg Hennessy
> > Quick question, assuming I can get a /24 public network, Who do you propose to bribe @ RIPE to get a /24 ? Can you pass me their details via pm :-) > and have > a private /24 address (quite densely occupied), does it have any > advantages, > from the firewall simplicity point of view, or sh

[pfSense-discussion] network layout

2007-06-19 Thread Eugen Leitl
Quick question, assuming I can get a /24 public network, and have a private /24 address (quite densely occupied), does it have any advantages, from the firewall simplicity point of view, or should I get for a smaller network (say, /26)? Some of the LAN machines need to have no access to the Inte