Hello Mike,
On Tue, 25 Jun 2019, Mike Snitzer wrote:
On Wed, Jun 19 2019 at 3:10pm -0400,
Jaskaran Khurana wrote:
The verification is to support cases where the roothash is not secured by
Trusted Boot, UEFI Secureboot or similar technologies.
One of the use cases for this is for dm-verity
On Tue, 13 Aug 2019 at 21:00, Eric Biggers wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 08:09:41AM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 22:47, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, Aug 12, 2019 at 05:53:19PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > > Instead of open coding the calculations
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 08:09:41AM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Mon, 12 Aug 2019 at 22:47, Eric Biggers wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 12, 2019 at 05:53:19PM +0300, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > Instead of open coding the calculations for ESSIV handling, use a
> > > ESSIV skcipher which does all
On Sat, 10 Aug 2019, Dave Chinner wrote:
> No, you misunderstand. I'm talking about blocking kswapd being
> wrong. i.e. Blocking kswapd in shrinkers causes problems
> because th ememory reclaim code does not expect kswapd to be
> arbitrarily delayed by waiting on IO. We've had this problem
