I think the general point is that when DMARC was originally written, there
was a general expectation that forensic reports were essential to get
domains to authenticate properly, and would be generally provided.
We now know that forensic reports come from only a handful of places,
mostly due to
On 12/15/20 8:01 AM, Todd Herr wrote:
I'm not sure there's anything actionable about DMARC's policy values.
you mean p=quarantine, or p=* in general?
Obviously indirect mail flows, such as mailing lists and forwarding,
complicate matters greatly here, as the handling by the intermediary
Info which is encoded in such a way that only the sender can understand rises
no PII concern, IMHO. A sender could cache sent messages and devise how to
encode the corresponding filenames in DKIM selectors. Reporting just the
failed signature would leak the whole message by reference. So
On Fri 18/Dec/2020 03:39:00 +0100 John Levine wrote:
In article you write:
We would like to close this ticket two weeks from now, by the end of the year,
so please get on it.
The ticket text is just:
Make it clear in privacy considerations that failure reports can provide
PII well
On Wed 09/Dec/2020 18:22:04 +0100 Dave Crocker wrote:
On 12/9/2020 7:23 AM, John R Levine wrote:
No. This is not a problem. There is nothing to fix. Please close this ticket.
+1
Fair enough. Ticket closed.
Best
Ale
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