Essentially all of what I proposed is possible with the current version of
ARC.
But to Ale's comment that "No test, no state to be reported", I have to
disagree. Assume that all in-transit changes are innocuous, so the
critical issue for evaluation is the original identifiers on the message
(Ser
On Sun 11/Dec/2022 21:43:51 +0100 Douglas Foster wrote:
ARC can prevent a message from being blocked by DMARC policy, but its
usefulness is limited because the mailing list receives no feedback and
munging is never suspended.
There seems to be consensus to specify an unspecified type in aggre
I'm of the opinion this goes back to Todd Herr's topic on the ARC ML
(Topic: Simplifying the Decision to Trust an ARC Header Set) as to
whether a validator trusts a sealer's results to be "true and correct".
With the method this is currently handled in adding of false DKIM
results, how can a m
ARC can prevent a message from being blocked by DMARC policy, but its
usefulness is limited because the mailing list receives no feedback and
munging is never suspended.
Outlook.com has a curious implementation of ARC. Their servers apply an
ARC signature to every message, asserting SPF PASS, DK
