--- Begin Message ---
> On 31 Mar 2020, at 20:29, Dave Lawrence wrote:
> Grant Taylor via dns-operations writes:
>> I fail to see how any government would prevent the necessary parties
>> from attending if / when they fully understand the need. Especially
>> when some of said governments
> On 31 Mar 2020, at 23:03, Vladimír Čunát wrote:
>
> On 3/31/20 6:47 AM, Brian Somers wrote:
>> One useful thing I could say (If you haven’t hit delete yet) is that I
>> *HAVE* seen RRSIGs with compressed signers in the wild, so never assume
>> that, just because RFCs say MUST NOT, you’ll
On Tue, Mar 31, 2020 at 3:40 PM Dave Lawrence wrote:
>
> Grant Taylor via dns-operations writes:
> > I fail to see how any government would prevent the necessary parties
> > from attending if / when they fully understand the need. Especially
> > when some of said governments have directives ~>
In article <22698cb2-ef91-f783-bc53-6f028cc6a...@nic.cz> you write:
>On 30. 03. 20 12:35, Meir Kraushar via dns-operations wrote:
>> - Obviously resolver compliance is very important (Knot support is
>> questionable?)
>
>We intend to release fix in 5.1.0 release, probably next week:
In article <22698cb2-ef91-f783-bc53-6f028cc6a...@nic.cz> you write:
>On 30. 03. 20 12:35, Meir Kraushar via dns-operations wrote:
>> - Obviously resolver compliance is very important (Knot support is
>> questionable?)
>
>We intend to release fix in 5.1.0 release, probably next week:
In article you
write:
>-=-=-=-=-=-
>-=-=-=-=-=-
>-=-=-=-=-=-
>
>Hi Petr,
>
>We see something similar, albeit not so extreme.
>
>It's less deep, only 2 levels:
>
>mx1.mx1.example.nl
>
>But we also saw this:
>
>mx1.mx1.nl
Same situation, *.example.nl and *.mx1.nl are both wildcarded, and
point at
In article <20200331092538.gy41...@straasha.imrryr.org> you write:
>> mx1.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.maxonsoftware.com.
>> A
>>
>> mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx1.mx2.mta-sts.mx1.mx2.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.cineversityoneonone.net.
>> A
>>
>>
Grant Taylor via dns-operations writes:
> I fail to see how any government would prevent the necessary parties
> from attending if / when they fully understand the need. Especially
> when some of said governments have directives ~> mandates for use of DNSSEC.
It could turn into a real-life
On Tue, Mar 31, 2020 at 08:37:30PM +0800,
Tessa Plum wrote
a message of 13 lines which said:
> Another question, in DNS server, how to count how many queries were
> from IPv6 interface, and how many queries were from IPv4 interface?
It depends on the name server. Here, is an example with
On 2020/3/31 8:38 下午, Ondřej Surý wrote:
I know that there's a plethora of DNS RFC (the standards that define
DNS), but perhaps you can start by looking
at the wonderful project that Bert Hubert started - teaching dns -
https://powerdns.org/hello-dns/tdns/intro.md.html
Thank you so much
On 3/31/20 6:29 AM, Tessa Plum wrote:
> When making a DNS query (giving the type is A) to an authorized
> nameserver to its IPv6 address, will the value in answer are also IPv6
> addresses? If the host doesn't have an IPv6 address, how will DNS
> server return?
No, A always means IPv4 address.
Hi Tessa,
welcome to the wonderful world of DNS and to this mailing list.
No, the `A` rrtype query is specifically IPv4 address. The IPv6 addresses
are stored in `` rrtype records.
When `` rrtype does not exist, but the other rrtypes does exist, the
answer is NOERROR + SOA record.
This
On 2020/3/31 8:25 下午, Bob Harold wrote:
The transport (IPv4 or IPv6) that you use to talk to the DNS server
should have no effect on the queries or answers. If you ask for "A"
records, you will get "A" records, which have IPv4 addresses inside the
data. But the data inside the packet has
On Tue, Mar 31, 2020 at 8:16 AM Tessa Plum wrote:
> Hello
>
> Sorry I am newbie to DNS.
>
> When making a DNS query (giving the type is A) to an authorized
> nameserver to its IPv6 address, will the value in answer are also IPv6
> addresses? If the host doesn't have an IPv6 address, how will DNS
Hello,
At 01:00 PM 30-03-2020, Bob Harold wrote:
Just wondering, have you asked if 3 of the TCR's might be willing to
actually come? With enough protections, would that be possible?
I am one of the TCRs. I confirmed my participation in the KSK
Ceremony which is usually scheduled for the
Hello
Sorry I am newbie to DNS.
When making a DNS query (giving the type is A) to an authorized
nameserver to its IPv6 address, will the value in answer are also IPv6
addresses? If the host doesn't have an IPv6 address, how will DNS server
return?
Thank you.
Tessa.
On 3/31/20 6:47 AM, Brian Somers wrote:
> One useful thing I could say (If you haven’t hit delete yet) is that I *HAVE*
> seen RRSIGs with compressed signers in the wild, so never assume that, just
> because RFCs say MUST NOT, you’ll never see these horrible things.
Sure, validators MUST NOT
--- Begin Message ---
Hi Petr,
We see something similar, albeit not so extreme.
It's less deep, only 2 levels:
mx1.mx1.example.nl
But we also saw this:
mx1.mx1.nl
--
Marco
Op 30-03-20 om 11:18 schreef Petr Špaček:
> while debugging some resolution problems we have notices really weird
>
On Tue, Mar 31, 2020 at 10:55:03AM +0200, Petr Špaček wrote:
> On 30. 03. 20 21:07, John Levine wrote:
> > In article <02fe7bae-fec6-f314-b189-4214b75ce...@nic.cz> you write:
> >> This is query list for domain truckinsurancekentucky.com:
> >>
> >>
On 30. 03. 20 12:35, Meir Kraushar via dns-operations wrote:
> - Obviously resolver compliance is very important (Knot support is
> questionable?)
We intend to release fix in 5.1.0 release, probably next week:
https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/knot/knot-resolver/-/merge_requests/965
I'm sorry for
On 30. 03. 20 21:07, John Levine wrote:
> In article <02fe7bae-fec6-f314-b189-4214b75ce...@nic.cz> you write:
>> This is query list for domain truckinsurancekentucky.com:
>>
>> mx1.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx1.mx2.mx1.mta-sts.mx1.mx1.mx2.mx2.mta-sts.mx1.mx1.truckinsurancekentucky.com.
>>
>
>>
> -Ursprungligt meddelande-
> Från: dns-operations För Robert
> Kisteleki
> Skickat: den 31 mars 2020 09:58
> Till: dns-operati...@dns-oarc.net
> Ämne: Re: [dns-operations] Contingency plans for the next Root KSK
> Ceremony
>
>
> > In light of world events we have developed
> In light of world events we have developed contingency plans around how
> to hold key ceremonies in the short term. To that end, we identified a
> graduated set of options, in summary:
>
> 1. Hold the next ceremony as planned on April 23, with a quorum of
> participants globally.
> 2.
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