On Wed, Sep 27, 2023 at 05:17:05PM +0200,
Petr Špaček wrote
a message of 48 lines which said:
> If you are interested in the gory details, BIND's description of the issue
> can be found here:
> https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/issues/2950#note_241893
>
--- Begin Message ---
OARC 42 will be a two-day hybrid meeting and the dates are *8th and 9th
February 2024,* to be co-located with NANOG 90 in *Charlotte, North
Carolina, USA.*
The Programme Committee is seeking contributions from the community.
All DNS-related subjects and suggestions for
On 27. 09. 23 9:38, Ralf Weber wrote:
Moin!
On 27 Sep 2023, at 3:58, Xiang Li wrote:
Hi Stephane,
This is Xiang, the author of this paper.
For the off-path attack, DoT can protect the CDNS from being poisoned.
For the on-path attack, since the forwarding query is sent to the
attacker's
Evening!
I don’t think this is true otherwise all resolver implementations would
> have been affected and not just a few. If you are on path direct behind
> the resolver of course all bets are off, but if you are on path just
> between the resolver and the forwarder those resolvers that are more
Moin!
On 27 Sep 2023, at 3:58, Xiang Li wrote:
> Hi Stephane,
>
> This is Xiang, the author of this paper.
>
> For the off-path attack, DoT can protect the CDNS from being poisoned.
> For the on-path attack, since the forwarding query is sent to the
> attacker's server, only DNSSEC can mitigate
