Hi,
I hope the WG will start looking at that "next step".
There are resource issues with running TLS to auth servers.
But, that is easily solved: the people who want to do this
bear the burden, and those that dont get publically shunned
(and possibly dont care).
Hugo Connery
Hi,
I tried to point this out at the beginning;
encrypting connections to local caching resolvers
without encrypting the auth resolver connection
gives the same security as Tor Browser.
But, something is better than nothing. Better for the world
having the "I live in an anonymity
Christian Huitema wrote:
> Is this part of DPRIVE's charter?
"...but it may also later consider mechanisms that provide
confidentiality between Iterative Resolvers and Authoritative
Servers, or provide end-to-end confidentiality of DNS transactions."
--
Robert Edmonds
I have been pondering DNS Privacy issues for some times, and I read with
interest a recent blog by Geoff Huston and Joao Luis Silva Damas
(http://www.circleid.com/posts/20160526_the_path_to_dns_privacy/).
Basically, we have two trends, somewhat conflicting. On one side, DPRIVE is
standardizing an
All
Since we never heard anything back from folks about needed face time in
Berlin, Warren and I have decided to cancel our time slot and give it to
a more needy working group.
We will both be around in Berlin if anyone feels the need to bend our
collective ears.
tim
On 5/25/16 7:54 PM,
A request to cancel a meeting session has just been submitted by .
___
dns-privacy mailing list
dns-privacy@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
