I just re-read that.
I support adoption with a target of being experimental. (It's
a bit of a fig leaf, but is correct in this case I think.)
I think this will be useful in proportion to the extent
to which the WG figure out ways in which this opportunistic
mode can evolve towards an
I believe when Brian sent the call out, he did say
"The focus of the call is the protocol defined in the draft."
The details do need to be fleshed out, but the chairs felt
the working group saw this as a starting point.
Also, as it was pointed out, the chairs have not seen any proposals
involving
On Feb 8, 2021, at 14:02, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>
> On Feb 8, 2021, at 10:01 AM, Jim Reid wrote:
>>
On 8 Feb 2021, at 17:11, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>>>
>>> Without a fleshwd-out proposal for a fully-authenticated protocol to
>>> compare to, saying that this WG should not try to fulfill its
On Feb 8, 2021, at 12:11, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>
>
> Without a fleshwd-out proposal for a fully-authenticated protocol to compare
> to, saying that this WG should not try to fulfill its charter to help encrypt
> recursive to authoritative traffic just seems wrong.
We went over this in great
> On 8 Feb 2021, at 17:11, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>
> Without a fleshwd-out proposal for a fully-authenticated protocol to compare
> to, saying that this WG should not try to fulfill its charter to help encrypt
> recursive to authoritative traffic just seems wrong.
Paul, just because the WG
It feels weird to have people object to this proposed protocol when they have
done little to describe a better one, even after multiple requests for them (or
anyone!) to do so.
Many of us would *love* to compare the opportunistic protocol proposal to a
fully-authenticated protocol proposal,
On Feb 8, 2021, at 09:27, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>
> I do not believe we should adopt this document.
>
> While I think it would be useful to have a mechanism for auto-upgrading
> recursive-to-authoritative resolution to TLS, and that may involve some level
> of insecure discovery, the whole
I do not believe we should adopt this document.
While I think it would be useful to have a mechanism for auto-upgrading
recursive-to-authoritative resolution to TLS, and that may involve some
level of insecure discovery, the whole emphasis on opportunistic in this
draft goes in the wrong
