Re: [dns-privacy] New Version Notification for draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt
> > >> 6. IANA Considerations > > " TODO: This document requires IANA actions (new RR type)." > > What new RR type is needed? Looks to me like all standard RR's. > > Thanks Bob! My mistake, this is a left over from copy/pasta. I removed it from master. Manu -- > Bob Harold > > ___ dns-privacy mailing list dns-privacy@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
Re: [dns-privacy] New Version Notification for draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt
On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 12:21 PM manu tman wrote: > Hi all, > > I have captured in a draft the mechanism I used during IETF 103 hackathon > and which is available aan experimental module in knot-resolver[0]. I was > taken short with time before cit-off date, but I hope this will better > explain how it works. > > Manu > > [0] > https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/knot/knot-resolver/tree/master/modules/experimental_dot_auth > > ——— > > > > A new version of I-D, draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt > > has been successfully submitted by Emmanuel Bretelle and posted to the > > IETF repository. > > > > Name: draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name > > Revision: 00 > > Title: Encoding DNS-over-TLS (DoT) Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) in Name > Server name > > Document date: 2019-03-11 > > Group: Individual Submission > > Pages: 7 > > URL: > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_internet-2Ddrafts_draft-2Dbretelle-2Ddprive-2Ddot-2Dspki-2Din-2Dns-2Dname-2D00.txt=DwICaQ=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw=aRgHK985qD76PXQaxDKSjA=jSTn0YgV5vZZxmSgDChO302kZVyakva0HQhlXmV_Ks0=9TmF-DXxE_0nJ6WyhRNoNSiya3N7h_pVwyRn4qIfD7U= > > Status: > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_draft-2Dbretelle-2Ddprive-2Ddot-2Dspki-2Din-2Dns-2Dname_=DwICaQ=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw=aRgHK985qD76PXQaxDKSjA=jSTn0YgV5vZZxmSgDChO302kZVyakva0HQhlXmV_Ks0=5eZd00_oyy5t1SFYXYCMfv1fSl22SudK5I3pkCozKFs= > > Htmlized: > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dbretelle-2Ddprive-2Ddot-2Dspki-2Din-2Dns-2Dname-2D00=DwICaQ=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw=aRgHK985qD76PXQaxDKSjA=jSTn0YgV5vZZxmSgDChO302kZVyakva0HQhlXmV_Ks0=ZTRurE9sjAPDCKcx8dBXgYPs0dE9LmmJ194vl04cn3Q= > > Htmlized: > https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_html_draft-2Dbretelle-2Ddprive-2Ddot-2Dspki-2Din-2Dns-2Dname=DwICaQ=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw=aRgHK985qD76PXQaxDKSjA=jSTn0YgV5vZZxmSgDChO302kZVyakva0HQhlXmV_Ks0=H0At0r1sQEdFc1snO7kIVALaFf-F1zRRHGPf3aUqkk4= > > > > > > Abstract: > > This document describes a mechanism to exchange the Subject Public > > Key Info (SPKI) ([RFC5280] Section 4.1.2.7) fingerprint associated > > with a DNS-over-TLS (DoT [RFC7858]) authoritative server by encoding > > it as part of its name. The fingerprint can thereafter be used to > > validate the certificate received from the DoT server as well as > > being able to discover support for DoT on the server. > > 6. IANA Considerations " TODO: This document requires IANA actions (new RR type)." What new RR type is needed? Looks to me like all standard RR's. -- Bob Harold ___ dns-privacy mailing list dns-privacy@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
Re: [dns-privacy] New Version Notification for draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt
manu tman: What I meant is roughly around the line of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bortzmeyer-dprive-resolver-to-auth-01#section-2 . e.g if you operate a resolver in strict mode, and DoT fails (connection to port 853, fail to validate SPKI) while the name of the name server indicates that DoT is supported. The resolver should fail. In opportunistic mode, the resolver will fallback onto port 53. The operator of the resolver will be setting the mode of operation. Hello, Ah, that makes sense, my reading was to allow the resolver to use 853 in oportunistic mode even when SPKI validation fail. I've to reread the text... Andreas ___ dns-privacy mailing list dns-privacy@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
Re: [dns-privacy] New Version Notification for draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt
Thanks Andreas, > what's the reason for "In opportunistic mode, the resolver MUST use the authoritative name server despite the failure." ? > A server operator can't distinguish between a resolver in strict mode an a resolver in opportunistic mode TOGETHER with a failure (on server side?) > An other option is to force any resolver supporting "dot-" names to fall back on port 53. What I meant is roughly around the line of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bortzmeyer-dprive-resolver-to-auth-01#section-2 .. e.g if you operate a resolver in strict mode, and DoT fails (connection to port 853, fail to validate SPKI) while the name of the name server indicates that DoT is supported. The resolver should fail. In opportunistic mode, the resolver will fallback onto port 53. The operator of the resolver will be setting the mode of operation. Thanks, Manu On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 12:12 PM A. Schulze wrote: > > > Am 11.03.19 um 17:20 schrieb manu tman: > > I have captured in a draft the mechanism I used during IETF 103 > hackathon and which is available aan experimental module in > knot-resolver[0]. > > I was taken short with time before cit-off date, but I hope this will > better explain how it works. > > Hello, > > for many years I run a dnscurve proxy [1] infront of my nameservers. > Worked perfect but virtually nobody used the encryption feature. > So, the draft *is* interesting to me... > > two points comes to my mind while reading the draft: > > 1. > key rotation is hard. > > 2. > what's the reason for "In opportunistic mode, the resolver MUST use the > authoritative name server despite the failure." ? > A server operator can't distinguish between a resolver in strict mode an a > resolver in opportunistic mode TOGETHER with a failure (on server side?) > An other option is to force any resolver supporting "dot-" names to fall > back on port 53. > > Andreas > > [1] http://curvedns.on2it.net/ > > ___ > dns-privacy mailing list > dns-privacy@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy > ___ dns-privacy mailing list dns-privacy@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
Re: [dns-privacy] New Version Notification for draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt
Am 11.03.19 um 17:20 schrieb manu tman: > I have captured in a draft the mechanism I used during IETF 103 hackathon and > which is available aan experimental module in knot-resolver[0]. > I was taken short with time before cit-off date, but I hope this will better > explain how it works. Hello, for many years I run a dnscurve proxy [1] infront of my nameservers. Worked perfect but virtually nobody used the encryption feature. So, the draft *is* interesting to me... two points comes to my mind while reading the draft: 1. key rotation is hard. 2. what's the reason for "In opportunistic mode, the resolver MUST use the authoritative name server despite the failure." ? A server operator can't distinguish between a resolver in strict mode an a resolver in opportunistic mode TOGETHER with a failure (on server side?) An other option is to force any resolver supporting "dot-" names to fall back on port 53. Andreas [1] http://curvedns.on2it.net/ ___ dns-privacy mailing list dns-privacy@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
[dns-privacy] New Version Notification for draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt
Hi all, I have captured in a draft the mechanism I used during IETF 103 hackathon and which is available aan experimental module in knot-resolver[0]. I was taken short with time before cit-off date, but I hope this will better explain how it works. Manu [0] https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/knot/knot-resolver/tree/master/modules/experimental_dot_auth ——— A new version of I-D, draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Emmanuel Bretelle and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name Revision: 00 Title: Encoding DNS-over-TLS (DoT) Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) in Name Server name Document date: 2019-03-11 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 7 URL: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.ietf.org_internet-2Ddrafts_draft-2Dbretelle-2Ddprive-2Ddot-2Dspki-2Din-2Dns-2Dname-2D00.txt=DwICaQ=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw=aRgHK985qD76PXQaxDKSjA=jSTn0YgV5vZZxmSgDChO302kZVyakva0HQhlXmV_Ks0=9TmF-DXxE_0nJ6WyhRNoNSiya3N7h_pVwyRn4qIfD7U= Status: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_draft-2Dbretelle-2Ddprive-2Ddot-2Dspki-2Din-2Dns-2Dname_=DwICaQ=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw=aRgHK985qD76PXQaxDKSjA=jSTn0YgV5vZZxmSgDChO302kZVyakva0HQhlXmV_Ks0=5eZd00_oyy5t1SFYXYCMfv1fSl22SudK5I3pkCozKFs= Htmlized: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__tools.ietf.org_html_draft-2Dbretelle-2Ddprive-2Ddot-2Dspki-2Din-2Dns-2Dname-2D00=DwICaQ=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw=aRgHK985qD76PXQaxDKSjA=jSTn0YgV5vZZxmSgDChO302kZVyakva0HQhlXmV_Ks0=ZTRurE9sjAPDCKcx8dBXgYPs0dE9LmmJ194vl04cn3Q= Htmlized: https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__datatracker.ietf.org_doc_html_draft-2Dbretelle-2Ddprive-2Ddot-2Dspki-2Din-2Dns-2Dname=DwICaQ=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw=aRgHK985qD76PXQaxDKSjA=jSTn0YgV5vZZxmSgDChO302kZVyakva0HQhlXmV_Ks0=H0At0r1sQEdFc1snO7kIVALaFf-F1zRRHGPf3aUqkk4= Abstract: This document describes a mechanism to exchange the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) ([RFC5280] Section 4.1.2.7) fingerprint associated with a DNS-over-TLS (DoT [RFC7858]) authoritative server by encoding it as part of its name. The fingerprint can thereafter be used to validate the certificate received from the DoT server as well as being able to discover support for DoT on the server. Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. The IETF Secretariat ___ dns-privacy mailing list dns-privacy@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
