Dear colleagues,
For my sins, I have been following some of the recent discussions
about Internet governance. One of the discussions over on the
1net list (http://1net-mail.1net.org/mailman/listinfo/discuss) is
about the control by one particular government of the DNS root zone,
and how
On 2014-01-14, at 12:22, Andrew Sullivan a...@anvilwalrusden.com wrote:
For my sins, I have been following some of the recent discussions
about Internet governance. One of the discussions over on the
1net list (http://1net-mail.1net.org/mailman/listinfo/discuss) is
about the control by one
On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 01:54:56PM -0500, Joe Abley wrote:
It's interesting to see that what was actually built in 2009/2010 is
largely compatible (at the high-level diagram level) with what was
proposed
I thought that was interesting too.
However, each RKO you add increases the operational
If multiple independent entities sign, can't they elect to use shorter
algorithms?
I know 'short can be spoofed' is out there, but since there are now n *
512 instead of 1 * 2048 is it not theoretically possible that at a cost
of more complexity, it can be demonstrated that as long as 1) the sigs
On 2014-01-14, at 18:04, George Michaelson g...@algebras.org wrote:
If multiple independent entities sign, can't they elect to use shorter
algorithms?
I know 'short can be spoofed' is out there, but since there are now n * 512
instead of 1 * 2048 is it not theoretically possible that at
On Jan 14, 2014, at 3:04 PM, George Michaelson g...@algebras.org wrote:
If multiple independent entities sign, can't they elect to use shorter
algorithms?
I know 'short can be spoofed' is out there, but since there are now n * 512
instead of 1 * 2048 is it not theoretically possible that
On 01/14/2014 12:08 PM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
Good point. I think the idea is that this is a feature, because it's
supposed to be the Mutually-Assured Destruction threat that will
prevent the USG from unilaterally removing some country from the root
zone (that seems to be the threat people are
thanks for the cluestick hit. so we can't trade multiple sigs for length,
which means for public benefit reasons adding more visible signers at the
top does irredeemably increase the dataset size because the key size has to
stay high.
there are no free lunches for public accountability.
On Wed,
In message 52d5db58.3040...@dougbarton.us, Doug Barton writes:
On 01/14/2014 04:43 PM, Doug Barton wrote:
Other than the DS records (if any) the records associated with a given
TLD (specifically the NS records) in the root are not signed.
... obviously the glue records are not signed
